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on 12 ilanuary 1981 a motion for a reeorution (Doc. L-?7g/gol
on the creation of a nuropealr financial instrument for recycling
petrodollars to increase and diversify world energy suppries was
referred to the Cqrmittee on Econqnic and Monetary Affairs ae the
cqunittee reElronsible, and to the corunittees on Energy and
Research, and on Develotrment and Cooperation for their opinions.
on 19 March 1981 the ccrmittee on Econqnic and Monetary
Affairs appointed Mr. ,r. purvig as rapporteur. rt considered
the draft report at its meetinga on ?3 - 24 November, i0 Novembe. _ ,
1 December 19EZ and 24 - 25 January 1963, and adopted it on the latter date
by a unanimous vote with 5 abstentions. I
PARTTCTPATED IN THE VOtrE
Flr rloreau, chai rman; Mr Hopper, vi ce-chai rman; trlr purvi s, rapporteur;
Mr Beaztey; Mr von Bismarck; llr Bonaccini; l,lr Caborn; Mr Carossino (deputizing
for t'tr Fernandez); Mr Franz; trlr Leonardi; t{r Nordmgnn; Mr Nyborg; Mr papantoniou;
Flr RogatLa (deputizing for Mr Watter); Irlr Rogers; llr Seat (deputizing for
Mr Schwarzenberg).
The op'inions of the Committee on Energy and Research and the Committee on
Devetopment and Cooperation'are attachcd.
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AThe Committee on Economic and llonetary Affairs hereby submits to the European
ParLiam€nt the fo[louing ltlotion for a ResoLution together yith Expl.anatory Statement
I{OTION FOR, A RESOLUTION
on the recycting of petrodoLLars
, The European ParLiarnent,
- having regard to the ftlotion for a Resotution tabLed by trtr lrtutLer-Herman, and
others (Doc. 1-799lEOr,
having further regard to the t{otion for a Resotution tabLed by lrtr Sayn-Wittgenstein
(Doc- 1-49ElE?) and to Partiamentrs previousLy adopted resolution on trade retations
betueen the EEC and the Gu[f States,
having regard to the report of the committee on Economic and lrlonetary Affairs and
the opinions of the Committee on Energy and Research and of the Committee on DeveLgB-
ment and Cooperation (Doc. 1-11971E?),
Considering that
a) inflation in the industrialLeed countries and the reeulting massive
increaseE in energy costs have dealt a severe blorr to grmrth
prospects in both the deveroSnd and developing worrd;
b) a substantial number of the leaet developed eountriee are in a
critical financial condition with dire effecte on the well-being
of their peoples and the stability of the world;
c) even though there has been a aubstantial adjustrnent to and
recycling of financial resources, theee have not reached those
countries mogt in need and on terms they can aocmnodate;
d) there ie an obvious need for more rational use of the world,e
finite ener!ry resources through more effieient uee and congervation,
and the develolment of alternative and renewable energy Bources,
thus neceesitating considerable investnent in both the
industrialised and less developed countrieg;
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(e) a Lack of adequate[y evaLuated projects, in the less deveLoped countries, is a
major probtem, and this is further exacerbated by a shortage of skiu.ed technicat
and manageriaI peopLe;
(f) another problem is the reduced investment capac'ity of the pr:ivate sector in aLL
the ltlember States and the excessive pubtic sector borrouing rrhich prevent the
European Community from honouring its obl.igations to the deveLoping countries.
(g) the cqnmercial banking and financial induetries world-wide have
Provided an effective meanE of recyeling oiI derived financial
surpluses frqn the oil surplus countries to the industrialised,
. 
newty i.ndustriat'ised and the best few of the devetoping countries
but have been unable to support the needs of the less developed
eoun'tries vithin the parameters of normal financial prudence.)
(h) the supranational organisationg (rMF, rBRD, rDA, tN) have nade a
conriderable e$frort'to meet the problem of irubalance in worrd finaneial
, and investment flons but are constrained by
the sheer scale of the problem especiarry in the reast
developed corrntries
the concern they must maintain for the interegts of thei.r
depositors and fund providers
the inability of many countries to bring forrtard, manage
and administer viable schemes
the prime concern of the traditionaL frrnd providers(the industriar.ised countries of Europe and North America)
to set their @irn econqtties and finances to rights, thue
restricting their ability to provide adequate fwrding on
appropriate terms
the unwirlingneas of the founding controlling countriee to
a&nit newry industrialiged countries and oil surplus
countries to their rightful say and thus discouraging
greater contributions fron **;
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(i) the predqninant trnsition of the US dollar in rorld trade and
finance, exposes all develogment and econqnic policies to the
full effeete of American econmic and monetary gnlicy, whose
prime concern is the domestic American scene and Jts ohrh pot'iticaL
ancj economic priorities.. rather than concern for the wortd scene.
the interests of the European Comttunity are much more closeJ.y
aligrned and intertwined, than American interests, with the oil
producing and developing countries.
Resolves that
The European Cqununity has a res,ponsibility to its owrr
inhabitants and the reEt of the worrd to pray its fulr part in
easing the flons of necessary investment resourees to mitigating
the effects of ener!ry.prices on its own,econonry and that of the
developing world.
1[he first cgncern must be'to restore equitibrium in the European economy itseLf
in that this could be the necesaary power house in terms of trade,
aid and investment to prmote'grorth in the developing world as
welI.
'I'tre European ComnunlLy, and other Industrialised countries, have
an obligation to continue and rei.nforce existing policies aimed
tovards reducing demand for non-reneryable energiec so aE to ease
preEsure on prices for the IeEe developed countries aE well.
( j )
1.
2.
3.
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4. The European cqrunr:nity should proaote and deverop close
formarieed relationships with (a) the oil surplus countries, and(b) the oil surplus cotrntries and less developed countries together,
with the purtrnae of discussing, defining and monitoring the
mechanisms necessary to achieve an improved mobilisation of available
resources.
The conditions necessary for the introduction of the ECU as a common currency forthe European community representing the strength of the EECrs economy as a whotemust be created as soon as possibte.so that it can provide a credibLe atternativeto the us doLtar in trade commodity pricing (inctuding oit) and investment ftows
on a yortd sca[e-
such inftuence can be exercis9d in particutar, in the direction of changing existing
voting rights and inftuence in ways that ensure a better representation of theinterests' of Less devetoped countries, nerty industriaLised countries and the oiLsurptus States.
lilhi I'e uetcoming the agreement in princ'ipte by the Group of Ten to increase substan-tiaLl'y the resources of the IFIF in order to heLp it neet the threat to the wortdMonetary system caused by the indebtedness of certain devetoping and EasternEuropean countries, caLLs on the conrrnunity, the ilember States and comnerciaL banks
concerned to ensur'e this is foLtowed up in concrete terms and reinforced by a firm
commitment to uphoLd stabitity in the Monetary System.
The European community shouLd act as one in the councits of the II,|F, IBRD, IDA andother supranationat agencies, in Line uith its perception of the potiticaL and
economic priorities in the wortd, and thereby exert much more positive influencethan its Member States do at present.
Artificiat' and probabty counter-productive, mechanisms such as a community oit-purchasing agency, index-Linked comnunity guaranteed bonds to attract oiI surptusfunds and fixed prices for oiI are unsuitabte as a means of achiev.ing the desiredimprovement in movements of capitar. and in the rortd financiaI markets.
The Commun'ity jointty rith a grouping of oiI surptus countrics shouLd consider
establishing yith the requisite equity capita[, a jointty orncd affiLiate of theEuropean Investment Bank and Arab equivatent (eg Arab Devetopment Bank) to special.isein the f inanc'ing of energy-reLated investments in Europe, the iliddLe East andthe tess devetoped countries, incl'uding in particuIar gtobat loans for the supportof smaIL-scate appropriate technoLogy schemes in non:oiL_producing deveLopingcountries' and that substantiaI interest rate abatements shouLd be avail.abtefrom the tEC budget andlor osc country budgets vhere appropriate.
5.
6.
7.
E.
9.
10.
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11. Priority should be given in the Cqnmunity for -
an integrated natural gae grid linking all Europe to euppliee
frqn the North Sea (Norrregian and Britlsh Northern sectorg),
North Africa, ltiddle East and USSR with the Southern North
Sea fields (tK and Netherlands) incorporated aB regervoirs
nuclear power and uraniun euPPlY
alternative and renewable errrgies
coal-field develoSment, infrastructure and teehnology
a conununity electricity grid, cogeneration and CEP schemes
research into new industrLal technologies
transport infrastructure.
12. priority should be given in the Less Developed Cor:ntrieE for -
agriculture, food production and prirnary crop processing
a&ninistration and management training
exploiting even small-scale indigenous energi:f resources.
13. Priority should be given in the OiI Surplus Countries for -
ener!ry resource maximalisation
adding value to energY resources
social and transport infraetructure
investment management skills -
14. 1rhe less developed countries must be able to justify
assistance and investment at least to the extent of providing
the environment necessary to give a reasonable assurance of
suecess, including
adequate a&ninistrative machinery at central and.loca1
goverrue nt levels
assuring reaEonable returns to outside investors, lenders
patent holders, etc.
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15.
giving top priority to self-suffieiency in food, energry
and provision of essential infragtructural services,
especially education
encouraging enterprise by their qrrr inhabitante and
avoiding grandioee schemes and projecta whlch are eLther
unnecessary for the corurtry,s devel0lment or dinert
available hunan and financial resources frqn other more
necoasary proJects.
1[he cmrrnity, if possible jointly with ttre oil surplue cowrtrLea
ehould set up a tagk foree to idantify worthwhire large gcale
and infrastruetural projects in (a) the less developed countrLeg(b) the oil surplus countries and (c) the EEC itself, to whieh
regourcea (botrr hrman and financial) ahould be directed and
which will moet readily achieve ttre prlority oDj'eetLilgs.
lrhe Cqtunrrnity should prooto q prPlininary scientific study ofpoteqtlal engagy resolEes in ths Biag lsd,.rrngmr,ored land areaB
of the world, to be follorred by more detailed etudy wberejustified, the results of which can be eold to corurpreial
exploitation cmpanies or governments aa aplropriate.
17 
' calle on the Cmaisaion to implerrcnt the recgaurendations
detailed above and to report to the European partiament and council.
of ttlinisters uithin 9 months on the steps takcn or proposed to be takenpursuant to this resol,lition.
I
16.
'a6,
I 
116. Aske its Preeident to fonrard thLs reeolutlon to the pregident
of the EEc cmission, president in office of the corrncrr ofMinisters, the iroint chairman of the EEC/ACp parliamentary
Assembly, the council for cooperatLon of the Gutf statec, thePresidents of OpEC, f![F and fBRD.
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BEXPIANATORY SIAEEIEIItr
I. ACKNOVI;EDGETIBTTS
1. Ttre rapporteur uould like to enpreee his appreciation to the
representatives of OPEC, OPEC Flrnd, the IMF, IBRD (I{or1d Bank),
Eurolnan Invegtnent Banlc, the EEC CmLeeion, the Fcderal Regerve
Bank in Washingrton, cmercial international banlcc and other
authoritieg, for the tine and trouble they took to provide
information and discuee the varioue otrtiona. ftrie reSnrt would
have had preeioue little validity without all thia help and
adviee. If it uere not for congtraintg of time and money,
further consultations rntght well have been benefLcial.
Alttrough in this relnrt and the attachcd motion for a resolution,
the case is aa fully argued ae trnssible, it is to be hopd that
it sitt also prqnpt further diacuesion so that the EEC
ingtitutione can take what action they decm advisabls on the
best reagoned baeis lnseible.
2. OpinLons were eought anrd received frm the EurotrEan Parlianent'e
Cmuittees on Energy and Research (1), regarding the ener!ry aspects,
and on Develolment and Coolnration (21 , regarding thc 5nrticular
needs and problems of the less develo;nd countries. fhese
opLnions are most cmprehensive and useful and have been talsen
into fuII account. in the pretrnration of this explanatory
statement (and the motion for resolution). 1[he ral4nrteur
would like to thank the draftamen of thege opinions (Ur. Muller-
Herman and tlr. Fuchs) for their valuable eontributions.
(1) PE 76.951
(2') PE 77.87t
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II. TIIE PROB.I,EM
Recyeling of world liguidity is not a new probrem. rt has
existed wherever one economic entity has amassed over any
eignificant period of time an undue proportion of the worrd's
monetary aesetg. The depreasion of the 193O's is often aeeribed
to the USA's positive balance of palzmente and ite steriligation
,in the form of increasing gold reaerveB. llhe post worrd war rr
period wag characterised by the Americans ,rec1rcling, their
arnassed reserves first bryr the Marshall plan, followed by many
years of defieit financing. rn this way the dollar shortage
of the 194os became the dolh glut of the 196os and r97os.
Nevertheless the availability of these resourcea in the wcld
financial'markets provided the wherewithal for the grolrth of those
decades.
With the Vietnam war the extent of thege US dollar balances was
expanded so enormougly, that the convertibility of the US do11ar
into gold at the fixed price of 935 had to be abandoned and the
prr chasing polver of us dollare held by foreignerg lra6 impaired
by the resulting inflation.
This trnrticularry affected the oil exporting countries lrho
reacted by iorming a cartel (OPEC) to safeguard their interegtg.
The method chosen vTaa to force increasee in the export price of
their oil to compensate for the devaluation of the curency they
received in exchange.
Arthough this action \ras precipitated by the Arab-rErael war of
L973, it is quite trrrobable that aome euch action would have been
taken anyway for reaeons of couunercial interest.
7- rn the era of cheap and cheapening oir supplies, the
industrialised countries (fCs) had naturally became more and more
4.
5.
6.
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8.
reliant on thia chaap aource of primary energy to the
diacountiug of otr,re*r 'Bonycgs o.f energy and energy conservation.
iDhe'f,trtt, 'otl ,1r"tee "'Sook' ,ff ,;1973 'tihutrDtrure lhook the ICe into
a gr.r6G6r .ffirfif,{rillGt8 6f tlss{r 'qu'otonic 'uha lroli.tieal dependence
on oil aad (ffiC bil irr 1nrutcutrbtr. :lttrc proecaa t*ar0c
divarrtftcutriffii "6f .q*illtcuu .'df umly.uind twardlr grceter bnergy
efficiruruey \ffi'*et tn t!!L.irl, t{strEEh 'strch'a proc€Bs Lnvblves
an i,nevitable 'tiile .lrg, which ia still 'ronking through 10 yeare
lattr.
Anottrar rcsult of, thir 'ahuuk' rilee the Aud&grr aecrual of financLatr
resourGsB m thu aiJ. ',uxqxrrtiilH cuttttr,itrs .and array frm the
iryrutrars. i$t ffis to tEhG t*rc .f,,tr 'tluu€ lrbsourcee to find their
*ay buck itrto the uorld''s fiTrancial ertcriee in the form of
coneumtrrtion of Lnd.uetsrial products o!. investlent. The time lag
in the eva[t *e only *obdrt, 4 lroara be,fore the 'eurpluses'
had been ra{liutrttilt{liat, .cryi'Ldtrtwr (a-lbbit 't h an altcred Plang.)
regained and thc tenptatlon for another 'shock' attenpt arose.
IO. tsho 'sGuond uil lrict uhek'AuIy occurred in 1979 and the IC
econonies, Juet hauing adJurted to the firgt, h,€re again equeezcd.
Itre curutrlatine teeult ia bott evidenced in the grorrth of
unaployrrent and mroh reductd rate of sconomic Arorrttr. And thig
iri rpitc of a5,gnif-rtcrnt cht,ftt in the relationship betwscn econmie
growth and tlrr inc,retse in'oaergy consualrtion.
11. If thc e'ffcct tag bbrlbut for the IC8, i.t $eE e1l th6 Eore so for
ttrc IiDCa rrE irr FLf,ticuler thc oil-itporting I$Ct. lfhcy 1erehit w the rGafifttur ln effih6 for thetr rt?r Eterial exports '
by ihc delrttffiu 'Ic3 Llldl by tte f,'tnrncffrl dErln rr.ultlfiE from
tho'nr*J.uu dxqis,ca in tlni.r oil iilIrort cortr, whl.ch mc all
ttlt ,rcr{c wrtqm i,h thet rhy bcqrmic grorfth in tuch bacl.c
rocmilict mqu{rcd a rslattvbly high cxtra denand f,or energy.
o
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L2. A particularly grievous effect for the LDCs arose from the world
monetary situation brought on by the shift of liguid resources
from the ICs to the oil surplus countries (OSCs). The ICs (and
e.specially the USA in that the dollar is the main vehicle for
international trade and invegtment) were forced to bid up for
money in the hands of the OSCs. Interest rates paid, and
therefore charged, on deposits and loans had to match the rate of
inflation plus enough to provide an attractive real rate of
return to investors. As the inflation rate waa iteelf induced
by large energy cost increases, the heavily indebted LDCs were
hit both uraya 
- higher energy costs and escalating costs of
servicing their debt. And all this impacted them inevitably as
the demand and price for their exports were reduced by recession
in the ICs 
- 
a receEaion induced by the same forces.
13. So while the ICs could, to some degree, protect themselves from
the direct consequences because of their diversified economic
bases and ability to impose rectifying economic policies, the
LDCs were not so able - even if politically and administratively
they had been willing.
14. Even so, the OPEC countries were agaj.n net borrorers, taken as
a whol-e, by the third guarter of 1981. The lag was less than
3 years, but within this overall picture there are certain
countries (notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) who are still running
in surplus and who have, in the meantime, amassed foreign assets
amounting to about $250 billion as well as undertaking massive
domestic investment progralrnes.
15. Tire weakness in early L982 of the oil market and the current
(.ruly L982) disarray in oPEc, if this continues for any appreciable
length of time, will no doubt help to rectify the imbalances
from the oil producing to the oil consuming economies. Perhaps
the fundamentar adjustments that have been made to energy
consumption propensities in the rcs will hasten and even
exaggerate such a shift. But the question remains as to whether
-14-
PE 80.462 lfin.
we will not remain exposed to volatility in the factorE of
production of which energy costs are ns, an important element,
and whether the available mechanisms are sufficient to deal with
such movements without burdening both the ICs and LDCg with very
difficult problems of roanaging their economiee and the resulting
effects on emplolmrent, indebtedness, standards of living and
development.
16. Etre critical probleme facing the ICe are
a) dependence on imported energy, especially oiI and the
need to diversify energy reaourees
b) restoring dlmanie grorrth eo as to aatisfy aspirations
regarding standard of living and emplolzment
c) resisting tendencies to protectionism and a breakdowrt
in the open world trading environmcnt
d) preserving Etable political and eeonomic conditiong at home
and in the LDCg.
L7. llhe eritical problems facing the LDCs are
a) dependence on imported energy and the need to develop
appropriate indigenous resources
b) promoting self-sufficienqy in food supplies at leaet
c) eecuring renunerative narkets for bagic raw rnaterial
exports
d) indebtedness and its cost
e) internal political and economic stability
f) balanee of trnyments difficultieg and the reanlting pfrlem of
paying for essential imports (eg spare parts, consumer goods)
.' g) lurproving adminietrative efficiency and effectivenesa.
-15-
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18. The critical probleme facing OSCg are
a) preserving cohesion of OPEC and value of oil reaourcea
b) preeerving value of financial resources
c) avoiding unweleome political inplications of international
monetarY sYstem
d) no substantial alternative to US dollar for inveattrent and
trade
e) avoiding politicaL and social complJ'cations of their
citizens' eudden rassive wealth.
III. SOLIITIONS
(i) ExiEtinq lrlechaniems
..= 
--------------
19. 11lhe commercial banking and finaneial systen has taken uP most
of the strain in recycling wcld liguidity- The gronth in the
euro-curreney (and related asian-currency) markete ie an
indication of the scale. From beginnings in the 195Oe, and
increasing grorth in the 195Os and 197Os, the estimated amounte
involved now are about $700 bittion net. Itris grotrth is clceely
related to the extent of the ICs (and particularly USA'g) groning
deficits in that they represent US dollars and other
convertible cqrrencies in the olrnershipof foreignere and the
depreeiation in real terms of those currenciee.
ZO. ftris markct ie very flexible in that it' ean deal wLth anlthing
from moncy at very short not,ice to 1on9 tern loars.
2L. It can also achieve a certain trdbsforrnatiOn of guch
reaourceg' fron shorter to longer term and fron lmer to
higher risk Eitilations.
!-
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22. However, there are obviously limits in that the institutions
concerned have to give their own solvency the highest priority.
While seeking the extra profit available from such
traneformation, this has to be consistent with the principles
of financial prudence.
23. Ehroughout the history of the euro-currency markets, there has
been concern whether the whole pyramidical edifice was etable.
These concerns have been accentuated more recently by the
doubts over whether the ultimate debtors, often heavily
borrmed LDCs are in a position to ser-vice the accumrlated
debt. ifhe effect of default by any such borrower or grotrp of
borroryers and the possible 'domino' sequence that might follow
are eertainly worrying. But ae yet no euch irremedial
event hae occurred.
'24. Being by definition extra-territorial, the euro-currency markets
are not readily sueceptible to effective government supervision,
control or rescue. This is in fact the reason they have been
so effective as they have been in the recycling Process and
could continue to be so. It nay aleo be the reaaon that no
irreversible disasterE have Eo far taken place.
25. But it is also arguable that
'b)
the situation is potentially explosive given the necessary
conjuncture of circumstances and that therefore some form
of international 'fire fighting forcer should be in
readiness
the recycling beDe fits have neceBsarily been reatricted and,
in particular, have accrued to the ICE, the newly
induetrialised countries (NICg) and only the strongest of
the LDCs
that therefore the weaker LDCs are falling further and
further behind with the resulting implications, not only
for themselves and their inhabitants, but also for world
political and economic stability.
a)
c)
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26.IntherafternathofWorldWarll,eertainggrl9:gi9e
institutions were estab1ished. Preeminent amonget these atre
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develolment
JI9!9-9I-E9I}g-E3!E). and the International l'lonetarv Fund JI-EE).
both based in Washington, D:C: ifhe IBRD has now turned its
attention from the highly euccessful 'recongtruction' of a
devastated Europe to the 'development' of the third world.
Directly and through specialised offEhoots'such ae the
International DeveLopnent Agency JIPI)., it provides grante, loan8'
project advice and management to LDCg. The IIuIF ie concerqed
prirnarily with balance of paynents problems. Often its.f,.inancial
support is accourtrnnied by conditions on eeonomic and monetary
rr6nagerpnt which supports the political will of the courEry
concerned to take unpalatable steps'
27. Although these bodies have undoubtedly played a major role in
rnitigating effects of the oil price shocki in both the ICs and Ll)8.,
criticism is 'levelled against them on varioug counts
a) Domination of their policies by the USA by its rights as
principal financial suPPorter.
b) unwillingnesE of usA and EuroPean lErticiPants to
acknowledge ehanged and changing facts of world financial
po\der by permitting greater role for OSCs, eepeeially
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
c) Conditionality attached to financial aeeistance' Such
conditionality may consist of economic, adminigtrative andr/or
management requirements being attached tO loane or grante-'
They may involve eecondment of "extrlertg" to monitor,
supervise or even control certain aspects of the recipient
country'e affairs. trtris can therefore arouae sensitivitieg
connected with concepts of national political and economic
sovereignty.
- 18 - PE 8o .462 lfin.
lrhe donor countries, especially the USA, are restricting
the resources available to these organieations and demanding
gtiffer conditions aa part of their orm harder eeononic policies
borne of a conservative reaction to the difficulties of their
ourn economies. lfhey do not aeen to appreciate how mreh
worse off are the LDCs and that euch an aPProach can only
worgen the'situation and prospects of the whole world eeonomy.
28. The responsea to these criticisma are aa follows
Tlre USA is by far the biggest provider of resources QSZ - 8O1>
and ean therefore expect to have the dorinant say. Otherwiee
it would not be prepared to continue such support and her
withdrawal would be disastrous for the recipient countries.
Ttre IIrtF and IBRD have therefore to give major consideration
to their providers of resourceE. Hovreverr p@€t is related
to long term eapital rather than shorter term deposits.
The reeult is a lack of ahort term deposite which could be
a way of encouraging OSCa to start using II{F ag an
intermediary.
Quotas, and the concomitant voting powers, were eatabliehed in the
very different circumstances of L945. It is often countries
like the UK and France who are moet insistent on the status quo
in order to maintain their tr=rogatives. A qualified majority
of 85% is required for critical votes, 8o the USA can
dominate. But 4 other rnain quota holders (UK, Germany, France,
Japan) do not let USA get isolated and theee 5 countries
effectively run MF. They elect the managing director, who
appointe his deputies, who in turn appoint senior gtaff. lfhe
IBRD also neede eapital restructuring, eEPecially to give
ilapan a role cormenBurate with its current statua. llhe
EEC countriee cotrld be determinant in improving attractivenesE
of both organisations to other potential creditor countries.
Itris applies to their mrn attitudes and the pressure they couLd
exert on the USA for a change (or evolution) of their capital
and voting structures. Subject to E1q19 safeguards for the
d)
a)
b)
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c)
principal ereditors including especially the USA, the MF and
IBRD could play a continuing and expanding role in recycling.
If there is no adjustment, they could well become
fossitrised and their role diminish. Certainly this is at the
root of the OSC's antiPaLhY.
The conditions imposed are strict and have certainly become
even more severe in recent years. [tris is variciusly
ascribed to the more straightened circumstances of the 'ICBr
as being the rnain creditore, and to the not unrelated
emergence of mrch more conservative political att'itudee
and economic policies in the main creditor cqrntr"iee
(USA, [IK, e'ermany, JaPan). IH]g regulations Prescribe
corlditionality and thi^s can be brutal. 1[trey should not
consider politics but in fact have to. The principle
question must be "Can they live up to conmitments - can
they carry through and survive?" The IUF is basi,cally
a short term lender and has to aafeguard its resources.
Beirrg an intergovernmentaL organisation political
considerations do arise. For example, the non-status of
the PI,Q means that Kuwait and Libya will not touch II'IF
The constraints of an institutional banking organisation
mean that the ItlE' cannot really deal with the worst cages.
It ought nore readily to admit where a case is itupossible
and carurot"be turned around within their resoureeg, but
officially it will help anyone and therefore ends up taking
the blame. On the other hand, the If{F is able to impoee
cOnditione on debtor governments and this in turn may imProve
aecess to funds from conunercial banks who eanno,t, impose sueh
conditions (cf. Po1and, Turkey). As a reanlt, banks are
beginning to welcome IIIIF involvement, which is taking
on the character of auditor,/nrerchant bank/fina.rrcia1 policetlan'
This standing and repute ig a vital elernent in co-financing
with other sources. IEEP iE also turning to co-financing
but, rather than eonditions, itE special inprt ia project
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a8e€ssment both in advance and during impLonentation' '
In fact, sone of itg exlnrt gtaff hava tranafeged to the
Kuwait Fund, Asian Develotrment Fund and EuroPean Investment
Bank, who are now becmLng able to lead schffisg. out of
g15 billion, the IB3D financee $9 billton direct and $e billlon
wLth pri.vate and pbl;Lc co-finaicetrs'
d) A conon argrument f,rm ered,itor corurtries La that throvring
money at problsns Provides no eolution. It 1g'norc lmtrrcrtant
to get basics right, sueh as a&nLniatration and agriculture'
. 
ll,trls view is generally ghared at the IMF and IBnD, bearing
in rntnd that their 1nlicy outlook le dqninated by the usA
and E\rropean eountries. It ls novr'a frrndanental tehet "to
helpthemhelpthencelvgg...ltisalgoderrarrdedttlatanyl
loans or granta are for reallsti.c proJeets that are catrnble
. of betng irnplernented and manaEea subaequently'' ' And overridt'ng
all, is the econmic argnrnent that the health of 'the ICs 'l i
Ls eggential to the well-being of tho IJDCE '
Ehsse argnments Eeem valid for those IDCg wittr apparent develolment
potentLal and a reasonable base of adninietration and techni'cal
;*rrr. It may 6ven stretch to gqne borderline cases' But tlere are
sqre 40 (?) lDCg tfirere the situatlon ie s.o bad ttrat lfe are talking
of little more than a llfe belt. rrr" r-Pl wag get up to deal with
such extreme situations but it has farlen four of arnerican objeations
ttrat tt le only aupportLng delnndence, LnefflclencYi corruptl'on'and
impractical ideologLee. No doubt carrot and stick bot} have'
their place. soqletimeB one hae to be hard to be kind' No creditor
or donor wants to be viewed aE a naive milk co,'' But there is
obviously great aiffiiurty 1n Judging the correct dLvidlng lin€'
and, even th€.r to eele what to do aDout thoee below the lLne'
,lftrere s€6lg to be leee eoncern'nowadays fOr eonlntitLve aaslgtanae
in theee caaeE between the Weetern and Corununiet bloc cotrltrl€s'
tftre IDA ie whOlly dependent on governmenta for fnndlng and !'aaEeg
on to the worEt caees'all that lt'has. It ie a channel which
removeg Edte national ldentifLeation of the donor' 'Eov'aver' the ald
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tt gines Lc oftcn omditional on the bene,flcLary grreharing in the
donor countrLca coneerned. rtre tano is more market baeed end
flexible, belng constraJ.ned only by its equtty baee, nou bel'ng
doubled. trtre IIBS hag difficulty ideologtcally with IDA and hae
reduced itg allocation of funding. lftre EEC countriee could ci'ther
cut back proSnrttonately or mai.ntain ttrelr level of firndlng' In
tlre latter case, they could asgert grreator eontrol of, IDt artd/ot
obtal,n a Largcr ehare of the contracts and purchaaes by bcnefLciary
countrieg. llhcre ta evidantly an oPlprtrrnlty here for a eoncertd
EEC aPProaeh.
2g.. lrhe EEC'g rols aould be deterruLnant in the [nlicy of ltttr' IBRD and
fDf,r It could outweigffr thc USA if it aeted as one entity' l[he
IBRD in gnrtLcular findg the EEC'o suptrnrt uscful eslncielly in thc
ca!€ of Afrl.ea, shcre there seqns to be greater nutual undcratandlng
. thqn betlueen t$e USA and Africa. EornOver, Lt has not uorked ln
practice ag *rcll-as night have been extrlscted. l[here is rocil"fot:
bEtter interchange of trnIicy, eeonquic and technical advic6' Becauis
cf certain lnllt!.cal difficulties r*hic[ arise frm time to ttms
between Af,rlqan'and EEC count'riesr it would be Eafer for all
concerned to uge the,IBRD as intetmediary. lfhe Europcans ars llorq
pragmatlc and could qtso help by brtnging greater preasutre to bear
on the USA to reach a cmPronise '
:
i.30. the. propoaed, end nol peJected, idea of an g3gI:II-3!gll!3!g to
thc xBRD ie probably not rrorth llnrsuing in its original foIm' But
the coneept is a geod .me and, rather than reelnnding to rojoetion
anotionally, tt ts t ohth considoring alternative says of reachlnE
a eimilar result. Elrjre are clsar financing attractions for the
ICs and the OBCr? $bQ wotld trave greater gearLng up of, rasouree! '
by ueing co-flnrncLng inethode uLth tlre prl'vate Eeetor' Ehc cncrgry
afflliate ooncopt, nircther with tbe IBRD, EIB or s6o otlrcr rcans'
should"aot bc oorraidered dead.
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31.
32.
11ttre EIB, Arab Develotrment Fund, OPEC Hrnd and other regionally based
organisations are playing an increasing trnrt in third world
develotrment finance. Largely their role has been that of co-
financier with the international organisations - an important role
nonetheless in providing funds at a. time of constraint on the Il'tEt
and IBRD. But these funds are becqning more and more calnble of
assessing and monitoring develolment projects thenselves, and
thereby to lead co-finaneing slmdicates with eaeh other, and the
private sector.
(a) currency
lfhe US do}Iar plays a pre-eminent and predorrinant role in
international finance. Not only are most loans, grants and
investments denqninated in US dollars but it is also the
denoninator for cqmnondities, including above all oil.
[trerefore the mo.netary and econqnic trnlicies of the USA and their
effect on the American currency are critical to ttttl ICs, OSCs
and LDCs. American interest rates determine the cost of
servicing loans. American inflation determines the real return
on OSC investments and influences investment decisions,
particularly by the private sector. Growth rates in the
American econqny have an important effect on grorvth rates in
other ICs and on demand for raw material ex;nrts of LDCs.
Ttre Middle Eastern OSCs. are estEcially concerned at the
ln1itical implications of their dependence on the US dollar as
a means of exchange and store of value. The freezing of
Iranian assets at the time of the American hostage crisis
caused alarm on this score.
lltrere is undoubtedly a need for an alternative to the US dollar.
lftre SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) available via the f!{F are
only a trnrtial alternative as they contain a substantial US
dollar c6g[PonenL (4?t in January 1981). ALso they do not f'represent any
identifiable econ@y with trntential for returns other than
(b)
(c)
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interest and have not achieved satisfactory levels of
acceptability. lItre ECU (Eurognan Currency Unit) is
attractive in that it contains no US doIlar cqnPonent.
Although it rnight be construed to represent the sum
of the EEC economies, its technical construction as a basltBt
and, as yet, minimal use in trade, co[unerce and investruent,
makes it of minor practical utility.
(d) On the other hand, OPEC sees Europe as having the trntential
for a much enhanced ro1e. lFtrey feel EurotrE haE a perception,
closer to .their o!{t1, in the trnlitics of the Middle East
and the developing countries of Aeia, Africa and Iatin
America. The stability and develoSment of the
MediterraneErn basin is a shared concern. In their eyes,
Europe has a better record than the usA in se;nrating
ccunmercial and financial functions frm political concerng
(such ae embargoes, fxeezes, confiscations, imlnsed to achievt
political ends). As the individual European econmies
and currencies are too small to eatisfy requirements, they
find much attraction in a more integrated European
economy and the develoSnent of a single currency of world
status to represent it. ltftrey have no doubt that if thie
occurred, oiI and other ccmnodities could be denminated
in that currency.
(g) ftre develolment of the ECU and its Proper managem€nt are
probably the things that could have the most beneficial
effect for -
Stabilising oil and other cqrunodity pricee for
Europe and those LDCs trnrticularly detrnndant on erlnrte
of cmodities to Europe.
Providing an alternative and potentially rnore attraetive
neana of exchange and store of value for aurplus
countries.
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Providing substantial investnent resources for the
European economy and thus helping LDCs with both
investment and demand for their produce.
Insulating Europe, OSCs and LDCs to a considerable extent
frqn American econonic and monetary gnlici es.
Boosting the role of the EIB and other European agencies
in their develolment roles.
Enhancing still further the role of Europe in world
1nlitical and econqnic tems.
33. Other mechanisms have been prolrcsed as trnssible solutions. lltrese
include index-linked investment outlets, long-term agreements on
oil prices and inflation protection, a European oil prrchasing
agency. AlI these after much conEideration by your raplnrteur,
Eeem to have one overriding defect. trtrey try to counteract natural
forces. The experience of other experiments with centralised etate
control of econqnic and counercial forces does not encourage any
great confidence that such expedientE would be any more effective.
It ie questionable if they could even be imposed while Etill
accepting the fundamentalE of the largely free and open market system
on which European (and world) grorth has depended in the past.
34. A New Financial Instrument? New institutions? l[here is of course
a wide range of financial instruments available for investment
in the EEC economy ranging fron equity shares in companies, fixed
and flexible intereet rate bonds in contrnnies and issued by
utilities, public cor;rcrations and nationaL governments through
to bonds iEsued by cmnturity financial organisationE Euch as the
EIB. Sqne of the latter have interest rates abated fron the
EEC budget (the New Corununity instrument or Ortoli Facility).
One can only conclude that there is no shortage of finance or of
types of investment instrument; the shortage is in the projects
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often restrained because of government policies regarding
prudent tevels of trubIic sector borrwingr.
The less developed countries also have access to borrming on
the euro-currency markets either frqn consortia of banks or
publicl-y placed bonds. The IMF and IBRD raise frrnds effectively
on their behalf in the internationaL markets. Although the
credit-standing of the ultimate borroner is vital to ability
to borrow, there is also in the LDCs a major shortage of
potentially viable projects cqning fortrard. In the worst cases
it would be difficult to justify any form of credit, even on
highly advantageous interest cost terms, and outright grants
are the only credible means of transferring resources. Although
such grants can never be sufficient to meet demand, there is still
considerable difficulty finding justifiable uses.
35. Tlrus your raptrnrteur concludee that -
T5e most useful innovation the Euro;nan Comrrunity could malse
is to provide a comnon currency as a means of eaging the
florps of international funds - the ECU.
Existing mechanisms are adequate for any desired leveI of
financing for projecte in the industrialised countries.
(c) l[trere is a crying need for more projeets which wiLl, at
least in the long run, enhance the contrntitivity of BurcPean
induetry - eg translnrt projects, energy Projects, etc-
(d) Interest rates ean be subsidised if desired otrt of governnent
or Effi budgets, but care must be taken not to dietort
recipient econmies either by providing unfair cmtrntition
to existing enterprises or preempting scarce htman resourses.
(a)
(b)
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(e) Grant aid to LDCs is in many cases the only plausible method
and it might be worth seeing if the OSCs would join with
the EEC to finance a kind of joint IDA, which would fund
projecte in these countries. Perhaps the provision of
human skills could be quantified as part of the EEC's
contribution, as developing viable plans and monitoring
implementation as important as the funding. [tris EEC,/OSC
agency could also work with and./or through the IDA itself.
(f) A jointly orned and financed energy affiliate of the EIB
and OSC eguivalent institution could have justification in that
energy supply and cost are at the root of the current
eeonqnic problems in both the develognd and less developed
wor1d. lfhe only question iE whether it should be confined to
energ:y but be broadened into suqh areas as transport in the
fCs and agriculture/crop processing in the LDCs. As a
credit institution it would have to have regard for those
providing funds and therefore would be confined to financially
self-liquidating projects, although one might envisage close
cooperation with the type of grant aid agency described
,- in (e) above.
lfhe only new elements that could be contrived (as in the
justification for (e) and (f) above) is in the sharing
of risks jointly.
36. Egsiprgs3l-rrser3lleeg-erl-p*s9lrlves!ts9!!-y31s9s3
@ounercial eontracts for oiI, and other energry products, can be made
on a term basis. 1[tle agreeruent is probably worth as much as
the willingness of the parties concerned to stick by the terms.
If prices move dramatically one way or the other on the world
markets, there is bound to be pressure to safegnrard irunediate
interests. One doubts if such agreements could withstand such
(g)
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pressures regardless. Investment can Eee ite return in the forrn
of fixed interest rates over any priod frqn one to tens Of yeafe,
or in appreeiation of the underlying asset in tetms of earning
po,rer or searcity (ie capital gain). lfhus both aapecte are
inevitably trnrt of a fimanric seenarlo. Predictions of inflation
trends and supply,/demand relationahipe uust inevitably be Part
of any such decision. Being predictiona they are by
definition uncertain. OnIy governments are in a 5nsition to und€fta
the open-ended counitments involved in this protrnsition and even
they will be, and should be chary of the e:stent to which they can gc
Indeed they could only meet Euch conmitrnents by foregoing beneflts
or resorting to'the printing press to meet obligations. Itre burden
(or advantage) is therefore indirectly transmitted to their
econqnies and popuLations through the fiscal or price
mechanisms. It is vital to understand that th€ advantage of, one
party will be the burden of the other party. 1ftrere is, if, at all,
likeIy to be only a very marginal aspect of mutual advantage
Ehe strains of self-interest are Likely to break uP a systen in a
very disturbing manner just when it is most needed by one or other
party.
your raptrnrteur therefore concludes that emoother adjustraent to
changing situations will be achieved by pmitting the natural
forces of the mar*et to work througrh. 1[here is trnrhaps scoPe f,or
governments (including the EEC institutions) to Ernooth euch
processe€ by counter-trend action, by ensuring adequate buffer
stocks, by encouraging divereification of supply sourcee and
mutual suplnrt in a short term crisis. Aborre all they ghould
work towarde econcrnic stability as circumstances ehange - ln thaf
this entails cmbating the dangers of inflationary and deflationary
spirals, thie will in turn be the best protection f6r those
investing in their econqnies.
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IV. RECOMMEITDATTONS
Your raplnrteur therefore coneludes that -
37. It is trnintlees, and could well be counter-productive, to f1y in
the face of natural forces ttrat determine supply and demand,
investment and develotrment. ErcouragLng, reetraining or
directing such forces is the most we can exlnct to succeed.
8,8. The EEC could and shourd, hwever, be prelnred to provide the
meana and mechaniems in its flnancial structure rhich will
facilitate flme.
39. rn this regard, effort should be concentrated on the ECU, ErB,
ERDtr, Strncial Cmrurity investment inetruments, coordination
of EEC 
€D€rEIyr infrastructure and deverotrment trnlides.
40. lfhe EE]c shourd olnrate as a aingle entity in its gnrld es
towards and managernent of supranational bodies such as IttF,
fBRD and IDA.
4L. A formarised mechaniEm shouLd be estabrished for trnricy
discuEsion and develotrment between
EEC and OPEC (or gnrha[rE more particularly the OSCs)
EEC, OSCe and LDCs
EEC and supranational agenciea (IUF, IBRD, IDA, ItN agencies)
the EEC side this ghould encorlEss, either jolntly or separately
Conunission, EuropeErn parliament, and Council of liiniEtirs.
42. ft is above all vital that the EEC should work aa a nnit in this
whole afea, rather thanras 10 indiviauif cor:ntries.
43. Etre health and vigour of the EEC is of vital concern to all other
countries which have trade and aid relationshitrx with it. It is
pE 80.462 tf in.
I.
2.
3.
On
the
-?9-
therefore v€rr much part of thie worrd-side reegnnsibiltty
ae much aa ln our own eelf-interegt, that the Eurolrean Cmnunity
be aehieved in all its econonic, Snlitical and indugtrial
aetrrects. Any proerastination or back-sliding will severely reduce
any ability of Eurolnan countries to determine their own uell-being
and contribute to the werl-being of the rest of the world.
-30- PE 80.462 lfin.
'i
European Communities ANNEX
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Wbrking Doqrments
r980 - l98r
L2 rlanuary 1981 DOCrrr{msT L-779/8o
IIOIION FOR A RESIOIJT EION
Tab1ed by l{r IOIJITER-EERIIANN, Mr KITBPSCH, ltr TINIET{A}IS,
. I{r \TERGEER, }lrs CASSANMAGNAGO CERRETII, ltr D'ORfiESSION,
lTr OIDOIINEII, [IIr EStrGEN, MrS VTALZ, !{r i'A}ISSEDI VA}I RAAY,
llr ITAIIGDS, l,tr NOBEf,ffirll, llr BERSANI, Ur WAVIRZIK,
l.lr von BISIARCK, tlr BEUf,ER, llr UACARIO, Itlr van AERSSEN,
}Ir iIONKER, I.Ir AT.BER, TIIr RINSCHE, I{r MICHET,, TIr BIJUIIETFELD,.
!!r SAtlSAl{O, l,lr ItrOEFUANN, Mrs MAIdI-l{Ec@N, Mr HERMAN,
Irlr SILTZER, l{r VANDEWIEITB, Mr HELllli, Mr SIIONNET and lrtr
BROK
on behalf of the Group of the European People's party
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure
on the creation of, a European financial instnrment for
recycling petrodollare to increaee and divereif,y world
energy supplies
Engtirh Edition
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The European Parliament,
- recognlzing that it has becoa vitar to increrse and diveraify
world energy supplies,
- 
convinced cliat the Ptrtnerehlp beBreen tlre highly inclue[riatized
gtates in the community and the undordeverolnd Acp strtsr which
are depcndent on support crcates r need for additionar effortg
to direct capital inEo channere which will inprove the economic
'developpent and standard of living of the ellociatGd statcr,
- faced with the gror,ring aurplules on current aceount in the oil-
produclng countriea and the worrying dcficite on the current
rccount of the industrialized statcs and in lnrticular of the
developing countries which are already deeply in dobt,
- conccrned at the monetary probl.m. crcrted ag a rerult which
ere certain to lced to ev.r greator economic and polltical inctabllity,
- belicving that the induetrlalircd nationr and thc oil-producin.l
countrlcs bear a epecial reaponribility in this rcrpect and that
tripartite talkg must take placr betwc6n tho industriarizad
countrics, the oil-producing countries and the developing countrica
in order to'atart reducing the cxcereive ceononrc diacquilibria ln
thc uorld by ueans of worlduidc'ccononic grorrth, the guaranteefl
supply of energy which this neceaarriry involveg and a rational
internltlonal division of labour vith the ultlnatc ain of pracing
world p€rce on a nore lecure footing,
- recogniztng firstly that the privatc banking Bystem cannot copc
in the long tcrm with the tark of channcrring the gntro-dollaru
in circulation and the riakc which ere oftcn attached to roans
to developing countries lnd reeondry, that the oir-producing
countrieg do not providrr capitrl eid to devcloping countriec
on at ride e basis ar night bc hoped,
- 
convinced that the European cotuuaity, without prejudicc to
the fleliberationa currently talslng place within the l{or1d Bank
and the rnternational Monctrry hrnd, should devclop n6y say!
of rccYeling.petro-dollarg, bcceurc a: onc of the economiealry
atrongert prrt! of the world it brars a partlcular reaponaibirity
for sceking a retionat aorution to thie difficult probrcn and
praying e part in such a solution, but also becauce it haa a
specific interect in safeguerding emplolmcnt end providlng an
opportunity for Comrunity undertakings to particlpate in
international exploration and infrattructura proJects rerated
to enerEy aulply,
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carls on the copmiagion to examine the possibirity of crcating a
Europcan flnancial inctrument with the following ains:
1. The Eu.ropean Community and thoge oi-I-producing countrlcr
willirrg to cooperate would provide the capital for the
new finarniar instrumenE, which might take the forn of e fund
or an agency.
.2. The capital provided in ttris rray elror ld primarily be used to
increase worldyide supplrcs of energy in the long teru. To
this end finance ehould be granted to appropriate infra-structure
and exploration prolegta.
(a) In the developing countries, particr;Iarly in the countriee
aceociatGd with thc eomunity by the Lom6 Convention, thc
developncnt oJ rninlng and r.,.rt'--.istructlt:e is a vital
.contribution towardc both retf-rufficienqyr in thr cnorgy
eector and general cconomic development.
(b) Corrsiderable re$ouuces of ere rgy cerr be exploited in the
offshore areaa of thr: European ConrnruniEy
(c) More eophisticated technological exploitation of exieting
and new oil reec:lrcea in the oil-producing countriec j,r
a tasli uhich rlll bc.cone extrenrely important in future.
(d) E:<ploitation of tha eoneiderable energy reaourcce of
raeny different kindt both on the occan bcd and in ruotr
and inacecseiblc parts of the yorld needs to bo anvttagtd.
3. The European Investment Bank should euperviae potential
projecta and exami.ne their econuric fcaaibility. As the
Eurolrcan Investment Benh heg already acquired valuable
experience in thia rBBIt€ct, ltr involvement epp€arr
particularly worthwhilc. Administrative coats could alco
be kept to a minimum i.n thi3 way.
4. The funds contributed by the Community should aa far ac :
perrrl.lrle hc 
':afsei on tlc eapital narket and if necesaary
be suppl.emented by the Conununity,a develolment fund.
5. Decieions on Ehe ugc of the funds contributed by th. comunity
and the oir-producing countries should be entrusted to a boerd
in which both partieg are represented in proportion to thcir
financial ccnt r.ibut ion
There wilr be certain initiar exp€naes knovnr as rtranafer
coets'. flre experience of the World Bank Bhoors that alI
other rigks are ninirnal.
5. ff theee projects are to lal<e a genuine contribution to
recycling petro-dollars to the benefit of the world econory,
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7.
partlcularly in the statea belonging to the Lon6 Connention,
th€ ComLecion will havc to nke ever? effort to intcnrify
the clialogrue with the oil-producing countrica and to erGand
thlg to a three-cornerad exchange including the lfhird World.
Ifhcn recycling oil eurgllugea it should bc rads clcar to all
concerned that in the nece.aarY efforta to achicvc urxLmum
eeonmic efficiency fron the imense aumg invested, it ia
Gven nore fuuportant to nake concrete ProEraaB touards reducing
thc €conomlc and lnlitical irnbalancee in the wor1d, ihlch havc
alrcady rerched dangcroue Proportionc, than to produce proflts.
Etre European Parliamcnt exPectc the @miseion to suhnLt
an opinion on this propoaal to thc EuroPean Parllamnt no later
than 31 May 1981.
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OPINION OF THE CTII'I].IITTEE ON ENERGY AND REPEARCH
Draftsman: Flr E. iluIter-Hermann
On 23 April ]981 the Committee on Energy and Research appointed
Mr Miiller-Hermann draftsman of an opinion.
t Th. committee considered the draft opinion at the meetings of
17 March and 29 April L982. It adopted the draft opinion unanimously
on 29 April L982.
The following took part in the vote: Mrs WALZ, chairmani
Mr GALLAGHER and Mr NoR!!ANTON, vice-chairmeni t'lr BEAZLEY,
Mr BOMBARD (dcputizing for Mrs LIZIN), Mr FLANAGAN, Mr FUCIIS,
Mr HERI,IAN (dCPUtiZiNg fOT MT MOLI,ER-HER"ITANNI MT KELT'ETT-BOWMAN
(deputizing for sir Peter VANNECK), Mr LINKOHR, Mr IIIARKOPOUpOS,
MT MORELAND, MT PERCHERON, MT PINTAT, MT ROGALLA, MT SASSANO,
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Petrodollar recyclingl
I. Introductiotrt General s,rrveY
The fresh surge in oil prices in 1979 has led to larger balance
of payments deficits than ever before in all the oiI-importing countries.
Fears are often expressed that the internationaf monetary system and the
international capital markets will be unable to cope with the task of
financing these deficits, particularly in the long term. Last year (1981)
the estimated balance of payments deficit of the industrialized countries
was US i 29,000 m and that of the non-oil developing countries (non-oil
DCs) US $ 97,000 m, while the oil-exporting countries achieved balance of
payments surpluses of approximately'US $ 96,000 m2.
Although petro dollar recycling (PDR) from the oil-exporting countries
with a balance of payments surplus to the oil-importing countries with a
balance of payments deficit has posed relatively few problems so far,
many of the oil-importing countries now fear that PDR will become more and
more difficult and the risks attaching to such transactions are being
assessed at ah increasingly higher level. Some observers believe that
debt ceilings are being reached particularly in some of the smaller
ind.ustrial countries and the majority of the non-oi1 developing countries.
The atarming growth in unemployment in most industrialized countries
in conjunction with the extremely high balance of payments deficits, Iargely
due to oil prices, has led to a dangerous and potentially explosive economic
situation which is increasingly,and justifiabty, giving rise to concern
that following initial, usually covert, measures in this direction,
protectionist proposals could gain more and more accePtance in future as
various countries seek to escape the international structural upheavals
triggered by the boom in oi1 prices by trying to seal off their countries
from the outside worl-d and thus use protectionism to reduce the pressure
on the balance of payments and the labour market. A solution to the
PDR problem must be sought to counter these threats to a more or less
liberal (world) economic order.
rcompiled in collaboration with the Drrectorate-General for Research
and Docurnentation of the European Parliament
2such estimates may vary considerably frorn source to source because of
different methods of cllculation, cornpilation and accounting,(those above are from the It'lF).
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It is bot,h striking and surprising in this context that, despite
considerable differences in national inflation ratee and, balance of payncntsdeficits rec}cli.rtg has sro far had rclqtively littla impact on exchange
rates. fhis docs' no1 houever Srreclu<io sarioue risks of this kind in
future which could at reast be conei.derabry diminlshed if a long-term
soluiien eould be found to the r.eeyellng problen.
Alt"haugh iberc haa been a clctr trend in receat years towards rower
srrrplusea in thc oil-cxporting countries and, snall deficits in the oil-inporting corrntri'esr ehiefly as. a result of lorer oil iroports by the oil-
iErporting eountrice rurd r*inimal incrcaecs in oil irport prices compared withthe tr+o previeua liGtrsl, the preaant sitr.ration is ncneth€less unstablepartieularly cs it seemr like1y that once the world-wide recess,ion has been
ovcrcome in the oil-irqrorting countries, their oil inports will again expand
and,/or the stabilit.y of oil prices will preve to be only telrporary sothat in futtlrc thare uirr again be a maiked inbalapce between oil,-importing
countries in deficit and oil e:qrortinE eountries in surplus.
?he first section below 1ooks a.t th€
connected with pDR and the secsnd seetion
of the non-oil developing countri.es.
general probleme ani obstacles
deale with the specific problems
II. PR'D - problane and obstacles
rt is often maintainedl that the events follovrj-ng the first boom in
oi1 prices in 1973/74 strengthened conficence in the viabi-lity of theinternational capital narlrets. rt is, however, inportant to recognize
that at this tine pDB was aleo less problenratic.
Following the increase in oi1 prices in
drastically increase<i their imports, in
voluma of imports rose by almost 4.0t and
and 1977 by approximately l5B each year.
L973./74, the OpEC countries
both 1974 and 1975 the
contrnued to rise in 1976
rn rear terms the oi,r price ferl back srightly after the abrupt
increase.
The recession in 1974 and 1975 led to a sharp fartr in irnports into
thp indirstrializad eo.rantries; the volune of OECD inports fell by
aE4prroNimtety 8T in 1975 and the vorune of oil inports by 9t.
the German GovcrnracntrE econenie advisers198O/8L }teport, ELra. l0 et. s€g., ond49 et seq.
Igee Annlal kports by
Tsacbvorst fuAig.a,r at i )I9AV82 :leportr prro.
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A major part of the remaining OPEC surplus was swiftly transmitted
to borrowers by the internationar banking system, in particular the
Eurornarl<ets. In 1974 Lhis accounted for half and subseguently a third
of the OPEC surplus available for investment. The remainder was invested
directly by the oil producers. There was little pressure on international
financial institutions such as the International Llonetary Fund, and, the
IIorl.C Banls.
The world economy must norv adjust to the fact that balance of payments
deficits and surpluses in the oil-importing and, oil-exporting countries
respectively are lil<ely to persist, at a high level for eome tine to come.
This'probrem is however riritigated by a number of other developments:
- As in L974/75 there is a marked trend towards greater absorption
( demand pull) on the part of the OPEC countries.
- The most recent OPEC decisions on price and production pol.icy provide
some grounds for hope that, in real terms, oil prices are unlil<ely to
rise substantially in the foresgeable future.
- In most industriaLized countries progress towards finding alternatives
to oil-,and t,o a greater e:rtent, the narlced recession have exerted a
d,ownward pressure on oil iemand and prices and thus eased the balance
of payments s:.tuation of the oil-inporting countries.
The effect of these developments has been that:.n f9B1 (accord.-i-ng to
the Bant< of England) the OPEC balance of payments surplus feIl to US$
77,000rn; a reduction to Us$ 52,000m is forecast for 1992. The nain
corollary of this reduction in OPEC surpluses has been smaller deficits
in the rnajor industrial nationsi however, most observers expect the
deficits of the non-oil developing countries to increase, or at least not
become any smaller, in 1981 and 1992.
Thus the, easl-ng of pressure referred to above is clearly either too
weal< or only ternporary anc from the point of view of the worlc econohy
an undesirabLe rjleans (=ecession) of providing a long-term and permanent
solution. In fact it is generally assumed that the internatronal capital
rnar!<ets will not be able to cope with pDR in the, long term forlowing
the second, boon in oil prices ln 1979/80. There aie therefore urgent
grounds for adopting new approaches in econoriric policy and for intervention
by national and international organizations. The main arguments are as
1roJ.Iows :
- t-he scale of PttR
- the low level of OPEC alcsorption
- increasing rislis in international investrrent iransacttons
- the resched.uling problem
ls.u, I(ieler DiskussionsbeitrHge (:iD) llo.75, 19gI
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The scale of PDR
Coraraunity expenditure on oil (i.e. of, the lline) increased as a
result of the oil price increaees in L97l/V4 and,1979/8O from Us $ 12,500 rn
in 1973 to appqorti-tsrc|y US I106,Q00 n in 19'81 (eetinated). Ehe growth
of the oil i-E{rort bil.l over. thie perioC shavre thet the sharp rises largely
corresponded tA.ritov€mnts in oil Pnicoc, i.". qhat th'e inCreaEe was solely
due to price ris€s rather than irtqreqs{}s in velu.ne: indeed the volume of
oil imports fell fron 5S5 m tqnnos in 1973 to 389 n tonnes in 1991.
This sbarp rise in the Qornrumity's ait biII hag been the nain cause
of the ruarked dcterioration in [hc b+]ryrcq on Qurrent qccount' or balance
of payments, fr:on virtual equ:ilibrium in 1975 to a deficit of approxinately
Uc $ 40,000 m in 1980 for the NiR€.
The balanee of paynents in aII industrialized states and the non-oil
DCs has deterioartod in a sinrilar narlner to that of thG liine. Conversely,
lhe balanee of payroents surplus of OPEC (the oil-exporti.ng countrj.es)
has grotrn from apnro:iimately U9$ 7,000m in 1973 to approximately US$ 100,000n.
Follouing the oil price boon in L919/g0r there was a sharp turnaround
in the terms of tradc. I{hereas in the peiiod 1975 to 1978, the terns of
trade deteriorated slightly for the oil-exporting ceuntries and iriproved
overalf for the industrialized countrics or r.ron-oil developing countries,
this trend was sharply reversed following the second oil price crisis in
1979/SO. As this trend is unlilrely tg change Cirection yet again j-n the
near future, i't rculd be unrealiEtic Lo expeet 4ny easing of pressure on
Lhe eountries euffering frqn a balanee of paymonts deficit frorn this source.
As far as solvinq the PDR problem is concerned, one favourable feature
is that over one thiri of ttre toial balance of payraents ieficit of the
OECD countries iE accountec. for by l:est Germany and ilacan. Thls ie
'favourabLe' inaEmuch aar ?orticularly fron the point of view.of ttle wodle
economic cycle, a major part of the total rieficit is being borne by those
countries which are best abie to withstand the strain, whilst countries
with greater internal oroblems are Iess affected.
Abeolute figurec are, houevcr, lGse ioportant than the ratio of
irnbalance in foreign trade to the eeonoslc poEential of the country as
a whole, i.e. to GHP. Looked at in thie way it is apParent that aeveral
of the Comrnity or OBCD countries and, particularly, nany oil-inpgrting
&veloping countries have much more aevere balance of paymepts problems.
Iilhereas the deficits of Japan and ttest $ernany which are high in abEolute
terms repreeent less than 2* of GNP, the proportion ie between 5 to 8t
in the cas€ of Greece, Denmark and lreland. for exarple.
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Although concern is often expressed simply at the high balance
of payments deficits in the oil-importing countries, it is not the
fact that oil is being bought on credit which is cruc,ial but the guestion
of how the resources which would otherwise have to be transferred to OPEC
immediately are being used in the meantime. The reluctance to become
too heavily indebted is motivated by a fear, which at least in the case
of many developing countries is thoroughly well-founded, that loan
servicing costs could escalate beyond the ability to pay and thus damage
international credit ratings. Such fears are, however, only justified
if loans are simply used to finance consumption and not when they are
used for investment
i3asrcally, the opportunities for investing petrodollars in the
oil-importing countries are favourable. Particularly since an improvement
of the terms of trade of the oil-importing countri6s is unlikely, there is
a strong incentive to produce in a more energy-efficient manner, to
switch between the different sources of energy and replace capital assets
which have depreciated as a result of oil price increases. Although
profitability has in fact increased markedly in these areas, this is
often masked by short-term economic trends and interest rate developments.
If the oil-exporting countries make their high surpluses available for the
necessary enormous investments in the oil-importing countries they coUld
themselves help to alleviate the effects of the oil price increases in the
importing countries
Given a current surplus in the oil-exporting countries of approximately
US $ 60-90,000 m, which is llkely to persist, the international capital
markets are confronted by a need to carry out financing operations and
<ltlte.r LransacLions on arl unprecedented scaIe. These recycling operations
are problematic when there is a lack of sound borrowers, i.e. when the
capital markets are not offered sufficient attractive investment oppor-
tunities. A lack of sound borrowers basically reflects a lack of
profit.able and secure investment opportunities. Essentially, there
is no lack,of investment projects in the industrial and developing
countriesl. But a solution to the recycling problem reguires not only
sufficient investment funds but aIsO an acceptable adaptation of investnrent
conditions. 'The world economy is, howevEr, still a long way from this
goaI. Capital investors still regard the risks for longer-term commit-
ments as too high. International banks are reluctant to lend out short-
term deposits for long periods. They complain that there is a lack of
original risk capital. In the final analysis a]l this'means is that the
banks' potential suppliers of capital regard the investment risks as too
high.
*In the Member States of the Community alone, demand for the necessary
energy investments in the period 1981 to 1990 is put at 500,000 m ECU(= 2.2? of GNP)(see Commission of the European Comnunities, Annual Economic
Review 1981-1982). Similarly, the World Bank (Annual Report 1981) estimates
the absolutely essential investment reguirements in the developing countries
over the same period, 1981-1990, at US S 450,000 m (at 1980 prices).
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countries which offer secure, high-yield investment opportunities
need have no great worries as regards their barance of payments deficit.
The opEC countries will be wirling to place their capitat with them.
To a certain extent this wourd sorve the recycling problem. rt wourd
reduce the risk for the worrd economy of the opEc states cutting oilproduction simpry because of a rack of sufficientry attractive investnent
opportunities for their surprus earnings. The oil-importing countries
will have to accept that for a certain period some of their growth wirl
have to be financed by capital imports. Given the enormous demand for
capital in the underdevel0ped regions in the world this may appear
contradictory. But for the time being oil price devel0pments have
created an entirely new world economic barance. The oir-dependent
industriarised states will only be in a position to export capitar again
once they have succeeded in breal<ing away from their dependence on the
oPEC carter by using less oil and empl0ying other sources of energy.
The sinooth operation of the reqycring process depends on two require-
ments, the need for which has freguently been expressed:
- free access to the international capitar markets must be assuredi
- the interest rate mechanism must remain unaffected.
There are crear signs that the oir-exporting countriesr balance ofpayments surpruses wirl remain this tirne, because in contrast to thesituation after L974, these countries are likery to experience:
- clomest ic pol iey rest r iet. ions,
- infrastructure bottlenecks and
- lle det'erioration in terms of trade.
The international capitar markets are 'disrupted, inasmuch as thebanks' balance sheets nord generarly refrect the pattern of financing
operations as it was in the 70s:
Concentration of loans, often on a few debtor
countries) with 1ow credit ratings.
Legislative or self-imposed limits reached on
capital and lending (sound banking principles)
countries (developing
the ratio between eguity
Equity capital developnent did not keep pace with the expansion ofbusiness in the ZOs.
countries
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t- No fundamental improvement in the equity capital basis is likely
in future given the deterioration in debtor rish.
- The low credit rating of the debtor countries often involves '
'spreads' (graduated interest rates) the negative repercussions
of which create a downward spiral of rgcession.
- Demands are often made for the creatlon of new financing institutions.
Re-s@]iry
- State institutions are often being urged to intervene in the recycling
process because of the oll-producing countriesr preference for gr?ater
liquidity.
- The periods for loans (particularly Euro-loans) have become much
shorter - a clear sign that the market is nervous.
- The borrowers, particularly the developing countries, however, need
long-term loans.
- However, if the growing preference for liquidity is largely due to the
existence of information and transaction costs, as is often maintained,
then it is likely that the re-scheduling problem will take care of
itself in time.
- It should be possible to find a solution to the re-scheduling problen,
at least in the medium*term, given free access to the market and a
flexible interest rate mechanism.
There are signs that the re-scheduling problem is beconing less
acute, as the fears that the OPEC oountries would increasingly prefer
short-term investments have not been confirmed recentlyl. In fact the
trend observed over the last two years towards nore long-term investments
has continued and this has helped to reduce instability on the inter-
national capital markets. l.lhereas just over a quarter of the OpEC
surplus available for investment was tied up for longer periods in IiZg,
the proportion in 1980 waEi a half and an even higher figure is expected
in 198I. This is combined with a clear trend towards a greater
diversification of investments in industrialised countrj.es, in which
Japan and West Germany have been the main beneficiaries.
III. The situation in the non-oil developing countries following the
second round of oiI. price increases
1. Balance of pavmpnts and indebtedness
After the second round of oil price increases in L979/80, the non-
oil developing countries are now in a far rrorse position than after the
ISee 198Ir/82 Report by the German Govefnmentts economic advisers,paragraph 51
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first in 1973/742
- Whereas the balance of payments surplus of the oil_exporting
developing countries (NB : countries with oir exports in excess of.,2/3 of total exports and greater than rt of totar worrd oil exports;
see International Financial Statistics definition) of only USg 6,600min 1973 shot up as a result of the price boom, finalry amounting in1981 to approximately US$ 9G,000m, the balance of payments deficitsin the non-oil developing countries rose from the still fairly
acceptable 1eve, 0f usg 11,500m in rg73 equally rapidry 
- armostin inverse proportion 
- finally reaching US$ 97,0OOm in l9gl. 
,
- The regional breakdown shows that this massive increase in balance
of payments deficits in the non-oir developing countries _ apart fr6min the l'tiddre East (NB see definition of non-oir developing countries)
was basically on the same scale in al1 parts of the world, although,the developing countries on the American continent (with us$ 40,000min 1981) accounted for almost half of the tothl deficit of this entiregroup of countries.
- Taking the financing of balance of payments deficits in the non-oildeveloping countries since 1973 individually, it can be seen that,following the increase in deficits, the percentage financed by.foreignloans and from currency reserves has grown steadily (to ?5t in l9g0).credit facirities from private and public sources, apparently widelyavailable for this group of countries as a whoIe, enabled them not onlyto finance their balance of payments deficits but, with the exceptionof L975, also to keep their currency reserves stocked up. This
stocking-up of currency reserves showed a marked decrine for thefirst time in r9g0 after the second oir price boom in 1979 and was
accompanied by a substantial increase in short-term finaneing on anunprecedented scare, with at1 the subseguent economic and poriticarhazards.
' This annuar rise in the vorume of foreign loans to finance barance ofpayments deficits drastically increased the overall lever of foreignindebtedness among the non-oil countries in the wake of the oir priceincreases, from USg 97,300m in 1973 to USg 370,.100m in 19g0.
when assessing current account or balance of payments deficits or theleve1 of foreign indebtedness as a whoIe, however, absolute figuresare ress important than the ratio'of foreign trade irnbalances or foreignindebtedness to the economic potentiar of the country as a whore.A comparison of the amount of foreign loans outstanding with the vo]umeof goods and services exported, (or GDp), for the non_oil developingcountries shows a sright gradual rise in the wake of the rg73 0ir price
round
-44- PE EO.462ltin.
increases until r978, followed by a smalL reduction d.espite a continuing
increase in foreign indebtedness. This small reduction is, however,
attributable not to an improvement in economic performance (exports or
GDP) in real terms in these countries but mainly to the accelerating
rate of inflation after r979, because in such conparisons (forergn
indebtedness,/exports or GDp) the export and GDp figures take fu]l account
of infration whereas onry the increase in the volume of foreign roansfully refrects the- effects of inftation and the earrier roans have a
lower value in real. termsl.
This global assessment of the foreign indebtedness of non-oi1 developing.
countries, however, does not take sufficient account of the structural
differences in this heterogeneous group of countries. I4any countriesin this grouP, particularly the low-j-ncome countries, find their financial
options far more restricted because of the increase in the price of oil
anci the international debts incurred in the past; even nob/ some countries
are having to spend r,rore than haLf of their e:<port earnings to pay their
oil bill and service Ioans. The developing countries in particular are
affected by the sharp rise in interest rates on the international capital
markets, particularly since interest rates have risen considerably forboth ord and new loans. This is largely due to the fact that over thelast decade many of these countries have relied less and less on the
rnternational Monetary Fund and the llorrd Banl< for roans, since theseinstitutions make their loans con<iitional on econornic poricy commitments
and have moved towards private banks which of course normalry onry grant
loans at adjustable rates of interest. This is one major reason why the
developing countries' costs simply for servicing loans more than doubred
from US $ 14,000 m in 1978 to over US $ 30,000 m in I9g0 and are llkely
to have become considerably higher forlowing the further rise in interest
rates in 1981.
Although it has hithert'o proved relativery simple to finance the non-oil
developing countries' balance of payments deficits, signs are now emerging
of clear debt limits. As this group of countries is rikery to continue
to be heavily reliant on foreign l"oans in the foreseeable future this willbe an important starting-point for dearing with the recycring problem,particularly as the potential creditors often complain with some just.ifi-
cation that interest and capital repayments could exceed the countries,
ability to pay and thus impair their international creditworthiness. rtis the resulting wait-and-see approach which has such serious effects on
economic policy which has to be overcome.
IUo. 
*o." A.*i* 
""" 
It{S Annual Report 19g1, pp.34 et seq.,IrlorLd Bank, tjorld. Development-Report 19g1, ip.'ag et seg. ,I,torld Bank, Annual Reporl I9g1, bp. Za.t'"Li.
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2. ]Iplicrtiong g$_elI-.c.!s for economic policy
rn the medium term, i.e. untiL the middre of the g0s, average growth
rates, according to the more recent uN and trlorld Bank forecasts, are
likely to be between 3t for the industrialized countries and 4-4tt for
the non-oil developing countries, with considerable differences according
to region a'nd lever of deveropment. Even such a modest increase, which,
for exeimple, impries zero growth in per capita GNp for the African
developing countries, presuppo"."I th.t
the leve1 of investment in the industrial and cieveroping countries
is maintained. Adequate investment is essentiar firstly because of
its effect on demand and earnings which stimulate the economy and
secondly because of its crucial medium-term contribution to the adjustment
process in the economy as a whole: both the a<ijustment of the pattern
of supply to shifts in <i.emand - replacing domestic demand by purchases
from the oil-exporting countries - and the adjustment of production to
the shift in the relative price of oir hnd all the prices directly or
indirectly influenced by this, calI for major investments;
the problem of recycling is solved. Assuning that the industrialized
nations manage to finance their balance of payments deficits, the main
task will be to provide the developing countries with sufficient capital
at Least to maintain their level of imports in real terms and to finance
the investments needed to adapt to the new world economj.c situation.
This is important not only in the interests of the developing countries
themselves but also in the (employment) interests of the (exporting)
industriallzed countries2 ;
- world trade remaiins as free as possible from import restrictions;
this applies not least to restrictions on imports from deveroping
countries i
- the world economy is spared further economic and political upheavals-
The curient balance of payments shifts in and between the various
countries or groups of countries reflect the combined effects of the direct
relrercussions of the second increase ln oil prices and the processes of
lsee also H.E. Scharrer 'Die lleltrvirtschaft nach dem zweiten olpreisschub,,in: Hamburger Jahrbuch fiir [Jirtschafts und GeselrschafLspolitii;
vo[. 26 ( r981) , pir . 5g-78
2th" fabt that in the years following the first oil price increase thedeveloping countries succeeded in breal<ing away to a certain extent fromthe recessioir in the industrialized countiies ind continuing theirdevelopmeht prograrrlmes with the aid of external financi"g h6rp"d-1"stabilize exports and employment in the industriar natiois. -
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adjustment to the (rea1) e><charlge rate fluctuations since the beginning
of the 70s (USA, Ialest Ger:many), the reactions affecting suPply and demand
among st-ate and prj-vat-e economic operators to changes in the terms of trade'
and the effects on trade and production of the disrupted economic cycle'
From the developments outlined above it can be seen that the first
and rnost important requirement for the future organization of international
moneEary relations is effective eeonomic and monetary coordination:
For the relationship between the oil-exporting and oil-consuning
countries it is particularly important to regulate oil price increases,
organize as predictably as possible the adjustment process in the
consumer en$ producer countries and provide a more stable }ong-term basis
for recycling, in the interests of capital investors, deficit countries
and (state and private) intermediaries and in the interests of stability
in the international economic system. The International I'Ionetary Fund
in particular could assume greater responsibility for the second and third
of these tasks.
As part of the rela'uionship between industrialized countries and developing
countries, the in<lustrialized countries must be prepared to accept the
developing countries' acijustment policies, even if they have negative
effects on certain sectors of the economy and/or the balance of payments '
This meani'Extendins 
*.e industrial statesr doctrine of the markst eoonomy
and, in this particular case, recognition of the fact that constantly
growing deficits in the developing countries above and beyond their present
level would of necessity jeopardize the stability of the international
f inalcial .rnd ec<-rtt1lnric system. Recognition of this principle does not
preclude a bilaterally or multilaterally coordinated policy to control
the rate of increase of 'sensitive' imports from the developing countries;
on the contrary, such coordination can provide the necessary precondition
for domestic acceptance of a liberalization of trade'
The world economy is at a crossroads. The guestion is wheLher it
can discover a tdynamic' and cooperative response to the major challenges
of oi1 price j-ncreases and internaLional structural changes or whether it
ctrooses the path of 'adaptation through rece6sion' with ever more
protectionism.
3 . P-i- q g.q.!_. _t_qg-q s, p y- -oP E-c.- !-o- -Jr-o. -n --9 i-I _dg_ve_]. Er._i ng .9olll 9l r -e I
In the light of the developments described above, namely the high
persistent balance of payments surpluses in the OPEC countries on the one
hand and the overwhelming balance of payments deficits in non-oil developing
countries on the other, there is the question of the opportunities and scope
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for direct aid frorn opEC to the non-oil developing countries. Before
considering this, it is necessary to analyze briefly the investment policy
of the OPEC surplus countriesl.
The total baLance of payments surplus of the oil-exporting countries
shot up from just over USg 2,000m in 196g to USg 6g,000m in 1979 and to
approximately US$ 96,000m in I98I. These high balance of payments
surpluses will persist over the next few years, i.e. the oi1 producing
countries' e:rpenditure on imports will not catch up in the mediuril term
vrith rising foreign currency earnings from oiI exports and investments.
The OPEC countries, particularly those with low capacity to absorb foreign
goods and services, are obliged to seek secure and profitable investment
opportunities for their financial surpluses
.The develoPment between 1973 anci 1980 clearly shows the guantitive,
reqi onal and chrr;noloqieal <i jmensions of the problem:
- The total net foreign assets of the oPEC countries rose from Us$ 7,000m
in 1973 to us$ 160,000m in 1978 and have since more than doubled wlthin
two years (to US$ 343,000m at the end of I9g0).
- OnIy seven countries - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, frag, the United Arab
Emirates, rran, Libya and eatar - have permanentry high and growing
surpluses. Their aggregate net assets abroad in 1979 were higher than
those of oPEC as a whole (because of the debts of other o?EC countries).
Since the end of the war, Iran has been produclng less oi] than during
the shahrs time and its foreign assets are declining rather than
increasing; with US$ 11,000m, eatar Iags clearly behind the othcr
cottntrles in tlris t.ategrlry. On thc other hand, SaUcli Arabia, with
almost US$ 120r000m, alone accounts for over one-third of the total
net assets of al1 OPEC states (197g2 42*).
- Of the other six countries, only Gabon has constantly increased itsforeign assets. rn the period t974 to 197g, arr the other states
recorded a balance of payments deficit. The surplus earnings accruing
to Nigerla, Indonesia ahd Venezuela since the sEcortd round of oiL price
incrgases and the ifiprovement of their net foreign position as a resurt,
are likeIy to be short-Iived even if oil prices continue to rise.
Ecuador and Algeria increased their net indebtedness to foreign countriesduring this period.
Thus there are only five countries which are capable of producing and
exporting more oil in the medium term than they need to finance their imports
of goods and services and which at the same time are important to thefunctioning of the international financial anci economic system because of the
scale of their investments. Irloreover, given their low internal absorption
r-
-See also: H.E. Scharrer, Op. cit., pp. 62 et seq.
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capacity, these countries are also those best abre to cut back oil
production without suffering direct growth losses.
The different absorption patterns in the OPEC States affeet their
investment object.ives and behaviourl. One investment aim is to protect
the countries' international liquidity against fluctuations in foreign
currency earnings and expenditure. This j.s a standard objective for which
all states maintain currency reserves. The investment periods are short,
normally three months, and the investment instruments are treasury bills
and time deposits in national and Euro-comrnercial banl<s. In the case of
high absorbers, this is usually the only investment aim; in the case of
low absorbers, only part of the totaf financial surplus is regularly
transferred to the currency reserves and thus earmarked to cover a
possible short-terrrr lack of foreign currency.
In these countries there are two other major investment objectives
irrespective of the level of surpluses: roaintaining reserves to finance
future imports and. perrnanent investments to ensure earnings in t,he long
term, given the finite nature of oil deposits. rn the case of these
countries, the use of resources is determined by the choice of developnrent
strategy. The development of the doraestic econorny always enjoys priority.
This is reflected clearly in the first investment objective cited above.
Thus several countries, particularly saudi Arabia, regard their foreign
assets as deferred development expenditure. Such investments are generally
geared to the medium term. Given this time scale, there is a preference
for fixed interest investments.
Investments to compensate for the gradual depletion of oil reserves,
on the oLher hand, are clearly long term. t4any GuIf states have acqujred
holdings in companies to protect the real value of their financial resources
over a long period of tirne. Investments are also made in long-term fixed
interest securities, where more importance is attached to yierd than
liquidity and in other, non-financial assets such as real estate or precious
rietals.
As far as foreign assets are concerned, the remarks by the Vice-President
of the Saudi Arabian ltlonetary Authority (SAI,IA), Sheik Ahmed Abdullatif ,
clearly show that such investments are not made simply for their own sake.
On the contrary, Permanent balance of payments surpluses and foreign assets
are acceptabre on economic and political grounds onry as rong as the gap
between the expected yield.s on oil investments (production restraint) and
on investments in foreign assets does not become too large. The predominant
factor here is the fact that oil is a scarce, finite rar^r material which
will tend to becone more and more valuable as time goes by. In addition
to 'purelyr economic considerations (comparative yields from oiL reserves
1s.", sheik Ahmed Abdullatif, A strategy for rnvesting the opEC surplus,in EUROI4ONEY, August 1980, pp. 23 et seq.
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and financial investrnents)1, th. representatives of the Arab surplus
countries are also motivated by a sense of resi>onsibility towards future
generations, and the need to leave them assets comparable with the oil
from which the present generation is profiting. This means among other
things that they wish to minimize investment risks in a sidrilar manner,
as Sheik Abdullatif puts it, to insurance companies and pension funds,
etc- in the industrialized countries: only first-c1ass investments are
chosen, as a matter of principle.
This means firstry that the opEc (surprus) countries are only
willing to grant direct loans to finance the balance of payments deficits
of developing countries to a limited extent. They prefer to provide
loans for the Thir<i World via the international banking system for two
reasons: the debtor countries are far more cautious with regard to
servicing commercial loans than they are about merely giving comnitrnents
to a government, and, seconcily, the ban!<ing community is better equipped
and has more conmercial expertise when it comes to assessing risks.
There is also the tacit expectation that the industrialized countries,
monetary authorities, as the commereial- banksr 'lenders of last resort,,
will provide a rde facto' guarantee for such investments. Some effort
is also made to diversify financiar investments in terms not onry of
instruments but also of currencies.
This has the following implications for pDR:
The barance of payments surpruses and surplus resources of the high
absorbers can be dealt with by the existing system as they are generally
short-term in nature. They pose no major adjustment problems.
ontry fi.ve og six countries are rst.ructural surpl.us countries. tlost
of these account for a significant, proportion of world oil production.
Priority should be given to talks with these countries on oil production,
recycJing and adjustment.. The main interest of the consumer countries
is security of oil supplies without abrupt price increasesi for the
majority of developing countries there is the additionar problem of
financing their balance of payments deficit (as a prerequisite for
continuing economic arowth). The interests of the opEC surplus
countries are, as set out above, to ensure the security of their
investnents, saf,eguard their value in rea] terrrrs and to obtain a proper
return on their assets.
4. As for non-oi1 deve} countries
As, for the reasons set out above, the non-oi1 DCs are unlil<ely to
receive sufficient direct aid from the opEC surplus countries, e{:her
solutions wilt have to be sought. As the problems of the non-oil ocs
-Given the-Iikely increase in oit prices in real terms, such a comparisonten<is to favour oiI, particularly the more production is cut Ua.L'.
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str
are largely connected with energy poricy, it is important to develop an
energy policy strategy for this group of countries. various aspects of
such a strategy are discussed below.
As explained above, the developing countries succeeded until about
1978 (before the second round of oiI price increases in l9z9/80) in
absorbiug the price rises without any maj.or disruptions. But since t.he
oil price boom in 1979/80, these countries have been suffering from almost
crippring balance of payments deficits. rn 1980 their oi1 import bilr
amounted to 5.3t of cNP (compared with 2.8E in 1978). For 1990, the
9lor1d BankI forecasts an increase to 6.22.
In some countries (e.g. Brazil, Turkey, India) oil imports now absorb
more than 50E of totar export earnings. Although trade and capital
transactions can malte some contribution towards reducing or financing these
deficits, great-er adjustments wilt have to be made in the energy sector
itself.
Energy consunption in the non-oil DCs is currently extremely low;
the 'energy intensity' (ratio of energy input to output) is far lower in
these countries than in the industrialized countriesi apart from other
factors, this is mainry due to'traditionalr sources of energy which are
not incLuded in the statistics and the row proportion of totar output
accounted for by industry.
Given the continuing population e:<plosion in the developing countries
(estirnated growth frorn 3,250 m in 1980 to 4,100 ra in 1990 as opposed. to a
growth in the worl<i population from 
-41460 m to 5,440 m) Sira tne relative
baclcwardness of the developing count.ries as regards industrialization and
economic growth, the llorld Banlc forecasts an inevitable increase in energy
consurnption in the non-oil DCs fron 13.7 mbdoe (mbdoe = millions of barrels
a day oil eguivalent) in 1980 Lo 24.3 mbdoe in 1990. Although this increase
in energy consumption may be offset to a certain extent by prrce trend,s,
the scope for t.he developing countries to circumvent increased energy
prices is once again extremely limited because of the lower level of price
elasticity compared with industrialized countries.
In its World Development Report 1981 (pp. 43 et seq.) the [,Ior1d
Bank emphasises that even in future the non-oir Dcs will only have a
marginal influence on the situation on the world energy market which will
continue to be dominated by the heavy consumers (i.e. the industrialized
states) and the oil-exporting countries with surpluses. The non-oiI DCs
must therefore of necessity adapt their policy to the new trends on the
world energy marl(et. rn the energy sector this implies the fortowing
adj usl-menL strategy:
G;; ['iorld Development Report 1981, p. 42
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Planning and development of the energy market must be fully integrated
into the respective national development projects.
A comprehensive substitution programrne needs to be developed to replace
imported oil by domestic sources of energy (hydroelectric power, coal,
wood and domestic oiL and gas). It has been estimated that total
domestic energy production could be doubled in the non-oil DCs between
198O and 1990.
It is estimaLed that annual resources of US $5O,OOO m will be necessary
(at I98o prices) for the implementation of this substitution programme.
If such a progranme is to succeed, it must be accompanied by energy-
saving measures backed up by price and target price policies.
Increasing energy supplies
The World Bank stresses that the non-oil DCs must increase their
efforts to develop potential domestic sources of energy (oiI, gas, coal,
hydroelectric power, uranium, oil shale and oilsands), which are becoming
increasingly economic to exploit with higher world oil and energy prices.
Given the special circumstances in the developing countries, particuLar
importance should be attached,to exploiting renewable sources of energy
(solar power, wind, biomass).
Although the proven deposits of oil and gas in the non-oil DCs only
amount to 2tr of total world reserves, the actual deposits are likely to
be [ar larqer since exploration i.r the past has been largely restricted t.o
cheap sources or those located near the main centres of'consumption. It
is therefore estinated that total oiI production in these countries could be
increased from L.5 mbd in I98O Lo 2.8 mbd in 1990 or even 4.8 mbd in l99o
with sufficient exploration work and investments (World Bank). Similarly
it has been est,ina,ted that natural gas production in these countries could
be trebled by I99O to 1.6 mbdoe.
In the case of coal, deposits in the non-oil D€s are estimated at only
10* of total world deposits. But here again more extensive exploration is
like1y to reveal far larger reserves. It is remarkable that coal production
in the non-oiI DCs has not increased substantially since 1973 despite the
increases in the price of oi1. This is probably essentialry due to the
long periods between sinking a new mine to beginning production, and
above all to the lack of sufficient capital to provide the necessary
infrastructure and transport capacity.
The prospects for the non-oi1 DCs in the field of hydroelectric
power are far more attractive since these countries could probEbly
account for over half the potential world capacity.
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As in the industrialized countries, the unconventional forms of
renewable energy (biomass and biogas, solar energy, wind and water power)
are likely to be an important source of energy for the non-oil DCs in the
future, particularly given their special circumstances, but they are
unlikely to be able to make any significant contribution to energy
supplies before the end of the '8Os.
$Pi!elr.q
The World Bank estimates the capital (investments) required by the
non-oi1 DCs to implement the energy programme outlined above at
approximately US$ So,ooom (at 1980 prices). rt is interesting to
compare this figure with the high oil import bill of this group of
countries of US$ 74,OOom in 1980.
If the investments in the energy sector described above were to be
implemented in the developing countries, the proportion of such investments
to total investments in these countries would double from 5t to over IOt.
Given the present financial and ecbnomic situati'on in the non-oil Dcs,
it is quite evident that these countries cannot implement such energy
investment prograrnmes themselves without significant cutbacks in economic
growth which is already at a minimal }evel. Such energy investment
programmes in the non-oil DCs are, therefore, inconceivable without
generous international capital aid and technical support.
TheroIeoftheindustria1izednationsandinterna@
The industrialized nations and international organizations will have
a major part to play in assisting the non-oil DCs to implement energy
prograrnmes. One first step, and one which should not be underestimated,
would be for the industrialized states to steadily cut back their oil
imports to make room for the essential energy reguirements of the
developing countries and at the same time ease some of the Pressure on
prices in future so that the financial burden on the non-oiI developing
countries does not grow at least on this account.
Above all, however, the necessary energy investments outlined above
can only be implemented with technical and financial support from the
industrialized countries and, in the case of capital, from the OPEC
surplus countries.
Despite major efforts, the non-oil DCs will not be able to mobilize the
necessary technical and financial resources on their own. Many of these
countries are severely restricted by their low credit ratings for private
bank loans, their lack of resources for exploring domestic energy resources
and an inadequate domestic political,/institutional infrastructure.
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There are also reservations on the part of the major banks and oil
companies in the industrialized countriesr particularly from the point of
view of profits and risks, they are extremely reluctant to provide the
enormous capital resources needed for infrastructure development without
which it will be impossible to explore and exploit domestic energy
reserves in the developing countriesi in addition, the major oil companies
are more interested in oil reserves which can be sold on the world market
than in exploring and producing oil for consumption in the developing
countries themsetves. They are also looking for greater Protection
against political risks such as nationalization.
Since the market economy machinery alone is unable to solve the
problems of developing countries, other ways and means will have to be
found. The World Bank has shown itself to be one of the most important
international institutions in finding solutions to these problems.
Although it has considerably expanded its activities geared to solving
the energy problems of the developing countries, there is nonetheless
political opposition to efforts to create an tenergy branch' to tackle
this problem in a more concentrated and comprehensive manner. New ways
and means are also needed because, even with wider terms of reference,
the worfd Bank will be unable to cope with a task of such dimensions.
5. Examples
The situation of the non-oil developing countries after the second
rourid of price increases can be briefly illustrated by the situation in
Tanzania and Brazil.
Although qanzeniat is already one of the poorest countries in the
Third World, it taced a decline in real per capita GNP in I98o of 5t.
Despite an increase in foreign financial aid of 15ot in real terms since
1973, the value of imports in 1980 fell below the 1973 leveI. But
notwithstanding the lower overall level of imports and a reduction in the
volume of oil imports (oi1 imports in 1980 were 5O,OOO tonnes down on
1972) the increase in oil prices meant that in 1980, 4Ot of tot,al export
earnings were abqorbed by the oil bill (as opposed to IOt in I97A). As
furthernore droughts and crop failures required food imports accounting
for a further zqt and servicing of loans took another 9l of exporq eqrnings,
Tanzania's financial resqurces were almost entirely qxhausted (with
negative net eurrency reserves at the end of 1980).
Although Tanzaniars desperate economic position is also due in part to
mistakes in donestic economic policy, it is guite clear that higher oil
prices have been an important factor in the almost total erasion of the
country's finances. Without outside aid to restructure its eoonomy and
reduce its dependence on energy, and thus reduce its oil bill, Tanzania
will of necessity slide into an even more severe economic recession over the
next few years.
IThe world Bank, World Development Report 1981, Washington 1981, p.83
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Brazil.l is often regarded as the country which has succeeded in
reducing its dependence on imported oil and developing its domestic
energy base.
Although Brazil had litt.te difficulty in offsetting the effects
of the first round of oil price increases by substantial export successes,
it was hit very hard by the second round. In I98O oil imports accounted
for almost half of total imports in terms of value and absorbed some 44t
of total export earnings.' with loan servicing costs taking a good 3ot of
export earnings, this meant that in I98O almost three-quarters of the
country's total export earnings were accounted for by the oil import bill
and loan servicing.
This pressure on its balance of payrnents forced Brazil to make
determined efforts to develop a bio-alcohol progranrme based on domestic sugar
cane to reduce its oil imports, an unprofitable venture given the prospective
structure of costs, not to mention its undesirable side-effects on the
environment and food supplies.
The exampfe of Brazilr on€ of the largest oil importers among the
non-oil developing countries shows that balance of payments problems,
caused mainly by the massj-ve increases in oil prices, not only lead to
unprofitable alternative fuel programmes but also effectively block the
development of projects which offer the prospects of long-term success but
require massive investment. And in Brazil, as in many other developing
countries there is no lack of such projects (oil exploration, water power,
renewable sources of energy).
Proposals, programmes, plans to solve the PDR ProlIeS
Indexed loans
Measures by existing institutions (IMF, World Bank)
- special II{F and World Bank financing facilities (link betvreen
the creation of special drawing rights and development aid, oil
facilities, structural adjustment loans)
European Community
Loans issued by the Community (in ECU); subscribed by the OPEC states.
Taken up by Member States and possibly also developing countries
(associated states, other states). Protection for the OPEC states
against currency risks.
ITlre world Bank, World Development Report 198I, Washington 1981, p.70
rv.
1.
2.
3.
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4. Zolotas PIan
Creation of an international loan insurance fund managed by
thc World Bank
Guaranteed by the IMF, World Bank, OPEC, industrialized nations
5. Brandt North-South Corirmission
- More direct financiar aid from opEC for development aid via
existing inst,itutions (Wor1d Bank - IDA)
- Three-way arrangements for developing countries with OpEC finance
and Western technology
- Use of IMF gold reserves as security and additional loan operations
via existing international financing organizations with loan
guarantees and joint financing programmes.
6. Gutowski-Roth PIan
The proposar by Gutowski and Rothl for a multiraterar agreement
between industrial"ized and opEc countries on oiL prices, oil
production, real returns on opEC investment and.the creation of
a deveropment fund to grant subsidized loans to the developinE
countries is an afnbitious attempt to bring together the divergent
interests of the OPEC couht.ries, the oil-importing industrialized
countries and the non-oiI deveroping countries. Briefry, the
. 
agreement would cover the following:
- The oi1-exporting countries would comtlit themserves to suppry
the oil consufters with oi1 at staridard prices with a binding
formula stipulatihg the maxj.num possible ihcreasE.
- fhe lndustrialized nations would offer the oil-exporting countries
seettrities with a guaranteed real interest rate in which.balance
of payments suf pl uscs coul cl be invested, ulr to .r t:ortain maximum
each year.
- A proportioil of the funds would be transferred to the development
fund to provicle loans tor developing countries on special terms.
'fhe cost of the subsidieed interest. r.ttes would be borne jointly
by the oil-exportinE countries and the industriaiized countries.
The forlowlng aspects of this proposal deserve special mdntion:
Firstly, it is an attempt to comblne the desire of the oil-importing
countries for gt€dtef, con'tinuity and stability of long-t€rm oil suppli€s
and oi1 price d€vel0prirents *ith the desire of the opEC countries,particularly those rCith capital surpluses, to find investrhent facilitiesfor their oi1 revenues which offer the same return as leaving the oilin the ground and at the same time contribute to recycling funds to thedeveloping'couhtries. secohdry, the detailed nature of the drafti-
'see A. Gutowski and w. Roth, vertragskonzept: opEC-rndustriel5nder 
-Entwicklungslinder, inl wirtschafts6ienst,'rgso,-uo. 12, pp. 602 er seg
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agreement should not be nisinterpreted, it is a draft and the details
can and should of courge be the subject of negotiation. It could Berve as
a uscful l:aeis for exploring the reaetions of the major oil-producing
countries and the industriallze<l nations in more detail and providing a
concrete approach to finding an acceptable solution.
Tlre Gutowski/Roth proposals coincide in some respects with OPECTs
Iong-term programme which, however, takes little account of the interests
of the consuning countrigs. Competition would remain largely excluded from
the world o11 market, which, Eiven the current situation need not
necessarily prove a disadvantage for the consuming countriea and world
economic development. Hectic price riEes at short intervals would be
replaced by predictable annual increases in the official prices which
would at the same time provide guidelines for the deveJ.opnent of alternative
sourco$ <>l'clrc:rgy to (:onvcntional oil. The burden placed on tho maJor
industrialized nations by such an agreement would,however, be considerable.
A further question is whether:, given the divergence of interests both
in the industrial nations and in the OPEC countries, such an international
agreement is at all feasible. In the past all international raw materials
agreements have failed. To some extent the oil-producing couatriee are
already going their own uray together with some developing countriee..
I.f a loan were E,o be used for an energy development programmg, the
t-erm coul<l bc extended t1 tvrenty years and the rate of interest brought
down to 2t. such an agrEement should be seen as a .result of the uNcrAD
conference in Manila in 1979, at which the Latin American countries in
particular blamed their difficulties on rising oil prices.
As regards certain criticisms of the Gutowski and Roth PIan, it is
I imporEant to note that only makeshift solutions can be found to the
world economy problems created by the second oil crisis in 1979/80 because
of the oil-exporting countries monopoly. The OPEC countries themselves
know ttrat the patterrf-of 'Bliiiiili".and"b'iiifidnt-6-n' tn6 wdrld'"norgf ."rx.t. ,
means that they do not have to let market forces determine oil prices.
7. Uiiller-Herman Plan
- Creation of a fund from the capital market resources of the
oil-producing countt'ies and the community with the assistance of
the European Investryent Bank with an insurance fund backed by
pukllic finances to qover political and economic risks.
i
v. coNclJr,rsIoNs
'thc committee on nnergy ancl Rcsearch recommends the comnrittee
. responsibrr: to incrude the following items in its motion for a
resolution:
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Recitals:
- havlng regard to
by the yec,r 2000,
a ri{se1y'population increage of 
.appqoxinately 2r000m
atnpgt ertcluaively in the countriea qf the Third tlorld;
whereas the goq,ls for econonic growth |q the thlrd Wsrld requite a majqr
expansion and d,ivaraifleation of energy supplice at th3 }oweet poseible
co6t i
havinc. ractrd to Eb* atrlfiotnc bolurc+ o! plrmrntr ffilcttl in thc
6evclopinq coUntflg rh'tctr *re alreed:r tlcrsly ln drcbt bDolu.o, ln the
rake of the oil orlon riEao, their lnevl,tr&lc enersv raqrllttrt€flltd
have led to inc4Glsa* otl b1L1s with' rh'lch thcy cannoq ' 'r
coDe i
having regard to the
to pay oil billa. and
lransrrce demand for capital In the Third'tfottrd,
to cxitott domestic enetgy raeoubces;
- whereda the lndustriallrcd countries and tha oll-producing'countries
havc special responslbility in this r.eepeet and *hcraas tEre'must b€
throe-way talks betwocn industriallzed nationa, oil-produclrig countries
and developing coqtlries.to lead to 4 reducgion in, ttp c;ormouB economic
imbarances ln the world hy mpan* of rorrdrrld& economic gtrorth which
in turn requlges secur.ity. of energy. eupplies, an0 a rationa'l internatlonaL
dlvision of labour; 
.
- convlnced:'that the.Conmuni,ty has the appropria.te eapacity,f,qg. Comrounity
undertakinE&, Lo plrticlpate in worldrwidc ixp\oratlon and. infrastiucture
projccts in the energy fieldl
- having regarfl to its rGport op trade relations between ttte EEC and the GuIf
Stateg (WIECAOREI(-ZEIL report (Doc. l-86 S/80))L i
- having regard to the firet tlN Conference on new and r&nawa&.1e)'souroce of
energy ln Nakobit 
,
Motion for a tarplui.ion:
- Callg, on the- induqtr.i,ati,zed nations to acBi8t the, ,countrise. of the Third
World not lea,st by eirbstantially reducing thelr consumBtlon of traditional
sourceg. of, energy. thirs-making a correFpondingly largcr, qu.ntity of oil
and naturatr gas availa$le for the poorer. countrieg. Th€ nore.the.indus-
trialized.'netione malee use of, sonventionar 6ourees of energy, the, greater
the pregsure qu prices to the detriment of the poorbr couniriee.,
- Recalls that Lhe Gonqunity has a particul€r re.sponslbiliqr. tqtEit, those
states with r{hlch it is" aesociated,
- urgea;tha,t the,er{leruiFe a,vailable in the comnunity. (e.gf 'rl,uetnatlve
energy slltf,ellts. such. as. solar, wind, tidalr geothermal .an4 b,*poaeg energy)
by deploy€d, l.f necessary as an export comfircldity andr in-aqnpetltion
with other induetriarized".nations, but the be&etit of the 6conomy, and
enPloyment in the, CornnUnity;
-OrI No. C 260, 12. 10..1981., p.28
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:
Urges that OPEC funds together with Community capital market resources
should be brought together in a fund specializing in energy projects;
Recommends that the capital a<--cruing from PDR should be used to increase
long-term international cnergy suppli.es and facilitate alternative energy
processe$. To this end appropriate infrastrucLure and exploration projects
should be financed;
(a) particularly the Islamic states and in the ACP states associated with
the Comrnunity, the developrnent of mining, infrastructure and
exploration in the energy sector has a crucial role to play in
improving domestic supplies of energy and general economic development;
(b) further major resources of energy could be exploited in the offshore
territories, including those of the Community;
(c) a prclmising project for the future is the more sophisticated technical
exploitation of new and o1d oil and gas resources in the producer
countries;
(d) considcration should also be given to exploiting the rich reserves
of energy of a1I kinds which are to be found both on the seabed and
in remote and inaccessible parts of the world;
Calls on the Commission to make a particular effort to achieve progress
with the above projects to recycle petrodollars to the benefit of the world
economy, especiarry in the ACP states and developing countries in the
rsramic wor1d, and to this end in particurar to step up tarks with the
oil-producing countries in the Gulf region as a first stage towards a
three-way consultation with the Third llorld;
Also calls on the Commission, together with the oil-producing countries
in the Gulf region, but if necessary as an independent Community measure,
to find a way of covering the inevitable political and economic risks
attaching to the projects described, particularly in countries in the
Third World, by a special fund endowed with budget resourcesi
considers that this is all the more essentiar as energy policy projects
which may be very reasonable and vital for the economic development of an
impoverished region will often only produce profits after unusualty long
periods of time, if at all;
Assumes that measures taken by the Community and its partners among the oi1-
producing countries will be seen from the outset as being complementary to,
rather than in competition with, efforts by the world Bank and the
International l4onetary Fund and deplores the fact that such arguments
have hitherto prevented progress towards the creation of an energy bank
as a subsidiary of the World Bank.
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OPINION OF THE COWITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION
Draftsman: Mr G6rard FUCHS
Oa 24 November: l98l tt'rc Committee on Developncnt and Cooperation
appointed Mr Gerard Fuchs draftsman.
The committee held an initial exchange of views at its meeting of
17 and 18 l*larch L982.
At its meeting of 26 April 1982 the committee considered the draft
opinion and approved it by.I0 votes with 2 abstentions.
The following took part in the vote: Dlr Fellermaier, oldest member
and acting chairman, Mr Fuchs, draftsman, Mr Cohen, t'Ir Ferrero, Mr Irmer,
Mr C. Jackson, Mr Lezzi, Mr Lomas (deputizing for Mt'Kflhn), Mr Michel,
Mr Narducci, Mr Papantoniql(deputizing for lt{r Loo ), Mrs Pruvot (deputizing
f or Mr Sabl6 ) , lrlr Wawrz i k .
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-T:llli c_oMM_r.l"rr,:It l)N -Dr,:vrLo.pME-lIt AND COOPF:IIATION
The Committee on Development and Cooperation requests the Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs to incorporate the following points in its
mot-r,on for a resolution:
- a policy of saving energy and developing energy sources other than oil -
pursued in the industrialized and developing countries - is a key element
in any st-rategy for reducing present imbalances;
- the industrjalized countri.es must encourage medium and long-term invest-
mcnL opportunities for oil surpluses; the increased stability thus attained
should favour the achievement of internationaf public development aid
objectives;
- the creal-ion of financial facilities such as already exist in the Caribbean
r:eqion should be encouraged, especially where they benefit the poorest
developing countries;
- efforts shoul.d be made t-o encourage in the non-oiI-producing developing
cclttrtt-ries the creatron of special accounts to be funded either by foreign
currency loans or by price reductions granted by the oil-producing coun-
tries, the money to be used to attain a higher level of self-sufficiency
in energy i
- the development of co-financing offering a form of i.ndirect guarantee to
encourage the providers of oil capital to invest in development projects
where immediate profitability is not assured should be encouraged as much
as possi-bIe; the development of joint co-financing should be preferred to
parallel co-financing and instruments should be fashioned to make it more
effective;
- efflort:s cltrected towards the creation of an'energy affiliate'of the
Worl.d Bank must be pursued;
- at a1I events the creation of a common'energy affiliate'of the European
Investment Bank and certain Arab Funds must be envisaged;
- the possibility of changing the existing voting rights in certain inter-
national institutions, in particular the International Monetary Fund,
should be given favourable consideration in the interests of creating new
international relations;
- the Community should ensure that account is taken of the effects on the
poorest developing counLrres of any proposal relating to the recycling of
petrodollars.
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II. EXPLANATORY STATEDIENT
RECYCLING OF SURPLUS PETRODOLLARS and DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS
I. o-1i_g_i.n gf-_-!lU:3._r9-b.Ig11
I. The nominal price of oil quadrupled on the first oil shock in
1973/74i after a period of stagnation in L975/78, it then more than
doubled over a period of eighteen months in 1979/80 (Table l). In
I98I, the price sometimes exceeded 34 dollars per barrel before falling
partly for technical reasons in recent months.
2. These two shocks, taken together, have produced in the oi1-
producing countries fluctuating, but considerabre (Table 2) balance
of payrnents surpruses, totalling over the tast eight years some 350,000
million dollars (the latestrevised estimate for 198I is 70,000 million
dollars ) .
3. At the same tj.me, the industrial countries, especially the non-
oil-producing developing countries, have experienced and accumul-ated
deficits, the former in the region of 30,OUU pillion dollars and the latter
in excess of the considerable amount of 400,000 million dollars (Table 2).
Por the latter countries, the annual balance of payments deficit multip),ied
by 7 between I973 and 1980, seriously coirpromising their prospects of growth
and development.
4. The hope of a drop in the reat price of oil, expressed again in
the light of the most recent trends, (the oil-producing countries'
balance of payments surplus may not exceed 30,000 million dolLars in
1982), should not be considered as favourable: a lasting drop in
prices could only come from a lasting fal1 in consumption, which
itself would mean even today an exacerbation of the world crisis.
rr. The basic phenomenon: a worrd-wide redistribution of income
5. Beyond the financiar phenomenon which we have just considered,
the basic phenomenon is a world-wide redistribution of income, brought
about via the new money flows set up by the oil bills themseLves.
The volume of these bills for the industriatized countries (253 , ooo
million dollars in 1980, Table 3) and of the non-oil-producing
developing countries (68,000 million dollars, Tab]e 4) shows, better
than the payments deficits, the extent of the levies involved.
6. However, it is important to note that for the non-oil-producing
developing countries, the extent of these levies 
- calcurated as a
percentage of imports or of GNp - is particularly high for the newry
industrialized countries (37t and 5.7t respectively) but remains more modest
for the poore-st countries, (17t and 3.lt respectively, Table 4), as
Lheir cnergy consumption remains limited for the time being.
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7. l,jnally, wt: nrus;t also bcar in rnirrd the increasc in the number of
producer countries, in particular in Africa south of the Sahara
(Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Zaire, lvory Coast), which
are to be added to the l-ist of countries of the Middle East which have
been the beneficiaries of the levies mentioned (Table 5).
8. The oil levies paid by the non-oi1-prorJucing developing countries
take the form of growi ng indebLedness and a debt burden which represents
an increasingly high percentage of exports or GNP (Table 6). The levels
attained today raise the problem of the solvency of many countries and,
consequently, that of the security of the internationaL financia] system.
III. The risks of llg-world economy a]rd wh
9. fndustrialized countries have reacted to the disequilibria thus
created by restrictive measures and aimed at restoring their external
balances (cutting public expenditure, credit squeezes, restricting pay
rises and, as a result, holding back private consumption), which have led
to a substantial slow-down in their growth.
10. The non-oi1 producing developing countries have, for their part, often
found themselves strangled: coming on top of a food bill which is itself
increasing fast (the value of which increased threefold bethreen 1970 and
1978), the new oil bill has in most cases led to a substantial cut-back in
imports (in particular of capital goods) and thus in the pace of developmerit'
]1. The danger facing the world economy as a whole is a soiral. of depres-
sion and unemployment (competitj,on between the indrrstrializeri eountries to
improve their trade balance by export subsidies and import- cont-rols; a
falI in imports by the non-oil-producing developinq countries and thus of
exports by the industrialized countries at a time when the market-s of the
orl-producing countries are becoming saturated; <liseguilibria are ther:e-
fore maintained and the cut-back on growth accentuated).
L2. More specifically, the danger facing the non-oit producing developing
countries is that of a reversal of the feeble positive results recorded
until 1973 in the growth of real GNP per capita. For certain African
countries (I8 out of 53), this rate of 'growth' is now negative'
13. The problem of the recycling of petrodoltar surpluses - the ability
of the world banking system Lo ensure a satisfactory balance of supply
and demand on the various capital markets - has therefore clearly two
aspects:
- the level at which the balance will be struck, which determines the
Ievel of world economic activity;
- the chances of development of the non oil-producing developing countries,
particularly as, whatever the development model chOsen, their energy
consumption can onlY increase.
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IV. Unsatisfactory solutions to the recycLing problem
14. The first resPonse to the shock of L973/74 was a race to export as
much .rs possible to the oil-producing countries. And, in effect, the
first financial surpluses accumulated by the opEC countries disappeared
more rapidly than expected, partly because of the drop in demand for oil owing
to the crisis, but above all because of the very steep increase in imports:
between 1974 and L978, imports of goods by the oPEc countries increased at
the rate of 30t per yeari between 1974 and 19g0, inports of goods and
services increased nearly fourfold.
15. Hohrever, this increase in imports has graduarly slowed down, in
particular because of the level of saturation reached by the tow-pgpulation
countries, particularly those on the persian Gulf, a 1eve1 which could not
be exceeded without greater use being made of foreign 1abour (which already
exceeds 50t of the working population in certain countries). The Iranian
revolution also revealed the social and political obstacLes that forced
grlesternization coul"d come up against.
16. Fina11y, increasing exports is not a possibility for most of the non-
oi1-producing developing countries, whose raw materials or simpte manufactures
have scarcely any outlets in the OPEC countries.
L7 - A second response to the problem of recycling petrodollars has been, on
the contrary, to use the short-term money markets (simple deposits or taking
over various tyPes of debts), mainly in Great Britain and the United States,
then in JaPan, the Federal Republic and France. This recycling hides thebasic problem by giving the newly industrialized countries the false impression
that, as their barance of payments is arr right, they can maintain their
standard of living.
18. 'fhe impression is false because the accumulation of very volatile
capital is unstable and dangerous; this is a matter of concern for the
investors themselves, who are seeking legitimate assurances against monetaryfluctuations which'are increasingly uncontrolled. Moreover, it forces the
countries in which the money is invested to adopt restrictive monetarypolicies which have an additional negative effect on growth.
19' suchatshort-termt approach to recyclingJ concerns the non-oi1-producing
deveroping countries very rittre, except indirectly by increasing the
ability of a certain number of monetary institutions, usually private ones,to give loans. Private financj.ng covers more than 50t of the total deficit
of the non-oi1-producing deveroping countries. commitments from this sourcehave increased so much that the failure of certain borrowers to pay courdlead to a dangerous series of payments crises. Moreover, very few of these
commitments have been in favour of the poorest developing countries, for whichonly long-term loans, which are not very acceptable to private banksr or€
conceivable.
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20. A final attempt at providing a solution was made by the IMF. But,
in the absence of a general agreement on the nature of the adjustments
to be made in the long term, the increase in 'facilities' remained 1j-mited
in volume and duration. And Ehe short-term conditions usually imposed on
the developing countries have in general proved ill-adapted to the
reduction of structural disequilibria ancl absurd in relation to development
strat-cgy.
v. 9lg3ls-q.v-.Jg-r.-.!-lig--lo-!e 
-L9rL!
2I. Without doubt, ally such strategy must include an energy comPonent.
The apparent balance on the oil markets today and the slight fa1l in
prices would not stand uP to a fairly strong resumption of growth, which
is, however, a vital factor in the fight against unemployment and the
pursuit of develoPment.
22. Whatever the trend of prices in the short term, an effort must
therefore be macle along the following lines:
- energy saving, both in the rich countries (in the three areas of housing'
transport and industry) and in the developing countries (by making better
use of traditional fuels);
- development, for the developing countries, of local energy sources, and
partlcular smal1 deposits of coal and oil ( some experts consider for
example that more than 30 African countries possess smal1 oi1 fields);
- the development of new and renewable energy sources (biomass, solar
energy, geothermal energy ... ) in the spirit of the Nairobi Conference
(August f98I);
- definition of energy strategies, based, in particular, on differentiated
use of the various existing tyPes of energy.
23. These efforts will be agreed to more easily if the price of oil does
not fluctuate too widely and, conversely, they wiII, in the long term,
enable the risk of new oil shocks to be avoided.
24. Then the financial strategy of the rich countries needs to be revised'
The risks caused by the existence of a mass of short-term capital no
Ionger need stressing. Medium and long-term investment of the petrodollar
surpluses should be encouraged as as to amplify the timid trends which are
beginning to emerge along these lines-
25. This approach offers the industrialized countries better possibilities
of financing vital new develoPments in industrY (the psychological and
political risk of seeing an increasing number of businesses taken over must be
overcome by negotiation). This approach can make it easier for the industrial
count-ries to increase their aid to developing countries, thus achieving a
sorL of,indirect rccyclj.ng of pctrodollar surpluses.
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26. Finally, specific measures should be taken for the recycling of
pctr()dollars f<-rr tho bcrlc'fit ol'thc non-oi1-producing developing countries'
Although, today, these countries receive some l5t of the flow of capital
from the oil-producing countries and although official development aid from
the opEC countries is very high as a percentage of their GNP (Table 7),
the existing system is not, as we have seen' adequate to solve the problem'
27. First one can envisage the extension of certain indirect aid mechanisms
provided by the oi1-producing countries in the form of facilities (see,
for example, in annex, the operation of the facilities managed by Mexico
and Venezuela on the one hand, Trinidad and Tobago on the other, for certain
states in the caribbean; similar agreements, less weII known, also exist
between the countries of the Persian GuIf and certain African states).
28. Then there is the possibility of cxtending the system of counterpart
funds, which already exists for food, to cover oil: grants or loans are
provided in international currency by the oil-producing countries and the
industrialized countries and linked to the drawing up by the recipient
countries of national energy strategies which will enable dependence on
outside help to be reduced.
29. co-financing is also a very promising method of recycling which should
be devetoped; since 1975 it has been a vital factor in the 'triangular'
cooperation between the EEC, the Arab development funds and the developing
countries (see for example Table 8 for the ACP). Cofinancinq has hitherto
mainly taken the form of parallel financing, where the donors finance different
parts of the same project. Given the convergence of views which emerged during
1981. between the EEC and the Arab funds for development aid, it miqht also be
possible to rnake use of joint financirig, r^ihere the donors pay out for the realization of a
project sums which are not specifically earmarked. The main interest of
co-financing is to provide the oil-producing countries with a form of
international guarantee for projects whose profitability is not always
immccliate and in countries which are not always obviously solvent.
30. Finallyr efforts to set up the famous'energy affiliate'of the World
Bank must be continued. Such a framework can, without uPsetting the existing
balance of power within the International Institutions, make it possible
for the donor countries to be more closely associated with decision-
making, with precise terms of referencei it thus facilitates the mobiliza-
tion of the 30,000 million dollars ProPosed by the world Bank for the
implementation of an international energy Progralnme over five years.
31. The EEC for its part should in any case consider the setting up of
an energy affiliate common to the EIB and the Arab Funds
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VI. 4_plflgggpfy:_that of mutual- interest
J2. The faII in the real value of a barrel of oil fr:om 1950 to 1973 is
undeniable and the desire of the producers to make up E.he ground lost and
guarantee their purchasing powef in future must be considered as legitimate.
Ilowcver, a contlictual approach to relations between consumer and produccr
countries, in the tight of the facts mentioned above, can only }ead to
further oil shocks and Lhe deepening of the crisis, to the detriment of all
in the end.
33. A contractual approach must therefore be proposed to implement the
long-term strategy defined above. This approach must be based on mutual
i-nterest in three dimensions:
- thaL <.ll tlre hj-<rhest- gnssible leve1 oF world er-'onomic activity;
- that of joint preparation for the 'post-oil' era via the joint financing
of research ancl projecLs in t-hc E j,c1d of new energies
- ttrat of the development of a new field of international relations outside
the hegemony of the two superpowers: Africa-Europe-Middle East
relations.
34. The 'l{l,l1ler-Hermann' motion calling for the creation of a 'Community
financial instrument', does not seem to fit in with this conception since it
gives the EEC a preeminent role vis-a-vis the oil-producing countries which
i.g a situation the latter are unlikely to accept.
35. Beyond the purely financial aspects of recycling, a contractual approach
must lead to acceptance of discussion of the idea of indexlng the price of oiI
so as to cushion the effects of the market convulsions which are bound to come.
36. In the same spirit favourable consideration must be given to the possibility of
modifying the present balance of power within certain international institutions
(and parti.cularly the 1!4F) with a view to creating new international relations.
37. The definition of this other system of international relations,
including multi-annual commitments, can contribute to greater control of
the world economy, help the developing countries as a whole to further
their development, encourage the establishment of a growing regular aid
flow from the richest countries to the poorest. The survival of thousands
of millions of men, the jobs of millions of wprkers and the chances of
peace also ar:e at stake.
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ANNEX
TABLE 1
Year
0i I Pri ce
Iro(1)
1970
1971
197?
1973
1974
1975
1976
't977
1978
1 980
1 981
1:80
?.?o
2.47
3.?9
11 .58
11 .53
12.38
1 3.33
1 7.05
28.53
32.00
Notes :Annuat averages, except for 1981 (January). Officiat or posted price of a barret(b) of Arabian Light (34' API) at Ras Tanura, price shading (t 0.30 to 0.50/b) yere
common in the earty 1960s.
Sources : Data prepared by author
For oit from 1945-1975: Gitbert Jenkins, British Petroteum Co.r 0iI Econonists. Handbook(London :Appl.ied Science Pubtishers, L976). p. 130.
TABLE 2
Payoents balances on current account 1973-81
(in biU.ions of U.S. dot[ars)
1973 1C74 1975 1n6 Et| 1978 1W9 19$ 19E1 TOTAL
Irdstrial. cqntries
Seven Larger ccrrrtries
fther cqntries
DeveLoping cqntries
OjL exportirp colrtries ,fbrci L deveLwirp cqntries'
$ area
Afriga
-.JAs ta
furqe
Middte tust
tlestem Heni+here
L
TOTAL'
19.7 -11.6 17.6 {.2 -4.6 $.E -7.E 4.1 4
14.1 -3.7 73.? 9.1 E.0 y.2 4.7 -15.7 -15.5 -7.9 -5.5 4.3 -1?.6 -3.4 -1?.5 4.4 -A
6.6 67.8 35.0 
€.0 31.1 5.3 8.4 11?.2
-11.5 -5.8 4.5 -3.9 4.6 
-T7.5 57.6 &..1
-?.o +.8 +.2 -8.0 {.0 -7.3 -5.8 -7.3 -14
+.5 4.8 4.0 -3.5 -0.7 -5.8 -14.? -A.7 -60.3 4.3 4.7 4.? -7.6 -5.2 -8.5 -10.3 q
-?.6 <.5 -7.O -5.4 -5.2 4.3 -8.3 -?.7 -84.7 -13.4 -16.6 -11.9 4.1 -1?.9 -a..9 -]f.1 -40
14.8 ',t9.4 6.'.t 6.9 -2.1 -3.4 3.0 -14.0 -30
%
-c?
-?9.2
460 .4{30.5
1. 01 gmds, services, ad private trasfers. For the ird.strial, corrtries, atternative qtrrcnt accqrrt ba[rrcesjncLtdirg officiat trtEfers are girrn for the years 197-fl) in T&te 9. projected 1981 batances inctr.dirg
cfficial' trilEfers are 8 50 bittim for the ird.rstriaL cqntries as a gru.p, 61E.5 biU.ian for the taqer
ccrntries and I 31.5 bitl,im for the othcr irdrstrial cqntries. For cLaseificatiqr of corrtries in grqps
shorn here, see T$tes 1 ad 2.
2. Fud staff projectias
3. Excl.uded data for the peql.ers Rep.bLic of Chiru yiw to1gT7.4. Reftects errprs, missians rd asymtr.ies ln reprtea bakre of palmnts statistics ptrs bal.ance of Listedgrcrs uith other cqrrtrie (minLy, the thisr oi. qiet. so.i"ti.t-nittics ad ottnr nsn*r cqrrtriesof Eastem turqe ard, for vears prior to 1gn. ilE peqteis n JtlI'r chind.
-6E- PE 80.462lfin.
TABLE 3
VALUL OF Nt'I OIL IMPORTS(lvlitIion doILars)
1973 197/, 1975 1976 pn B?8 pn 1980
fustria
Betgium
Demark
France
@mry
Ital.y
Itbtherl,ards
PortqaL
Spain
fueden
Switzertard
U.K.
TOTAI.. EUROPE 12
9125 948 1 081?ztfi 2W 2505
15(4 1705 1714
11 159 11 191 11 !61
13 3y2 14 171 11 617
8 021 8375 8 6%2828 305E ?69
59? 65? 73843n 3765 4513
2861 3028 280s
1 465 1 551 1 724
78n 5129 1497
1727 268729n 4 6n
2 651 3 18716M ?6593
24 528 3? @5
11 g? 19 860
4 514 6 589
1 143 1 815
6 7CD 10 848
5 21? 6 480
3m. 3738
2331 n
3?5 765 745
6n 2357 1 E8E637 1t{r6 145?
3 218 10 380 9 3m
5 078 11 310 11 M
2395 7971 7587836 19Q. 1816
119 t$7 489887 3016 3t49
1 0't4 ? 114 2 %1758 13% 13]63289 8975 7frl
19 ?35 52 1n 49 4n 57 A7 56 ?? 56 917 83 @6 118 606
Canah
Japan
U.S.A.
TOTAL ABO/E CqI,ITRIES
&3 15? 196 9s4 1 41? 1 593 990 ?53761?5 & 781 & U? ?3 257 ?5 U+3 ?5 n6 38 059 57 tr,7
7 031 ?3 418 ?7 3n 9 n7 4nS t0 037 57 5?6 74 103
31 7S 96 476 97 W 11? 215 1?6 tA p4 34 1n 74 25? 913
Solrce : OiL ard Erergy Trerds, Statistical Revieu 1981 ; prepared ard pubtished by Ererry.Research Ltd.
TABLE 4
lHE IIFACT OF THE SECOf\D OIL PRICE II'ICREASEA(N NET OIL
IIIFORTIrc DR/ELOPIIG CO,hITRITS
a) Oit ilprt f igures for 1%9 are based m the 1978 oi[ inport votune, +l.yins the armage oil. price forPn $ 19 per barret) nd 1%0 (8 30 per barrel.); hodever, adjwtncnts have been made to correct oil
irport rrctr-ms for cqntries for nhich avaiLabte informatim irdicated charBes fnnr the 19Zg inportwtue (e.9. dr to increased dolestic erergr prodrtisr caservatim, inport ceiLirBs, increased
use of atternative etrrgy, etc.)b) Irports irrcttrde gooG (inctudirg oil.) ard services
c) Figures for'1979 are privisimat ard those for 19g0 are estimatesd Ihe NICs in this tabte & rpt incLrde tbg KmS ad SirBapre
Cantries ard
cq.ntry grq{cs
0'iL inport bil.L (6 miLl,im) As percent of irportsb As percent of GIP
1978 1979c 1%0c 1978 ltr/nc 1ql0c 1c78 19nc 1960c
LICs
LLDCs
Bangl.adesh
Tarzaria
Irdia
Pakistan
NIcsd
Brazi L
Spain
Korea Reg.bLic
Other MICs
Turkey
Thai Lard
Phil.ipires
I\ory Coast
TOTAL
6 s50 9 860980 1 520703ro2m ?m3.5m 5 3m
sm fia
25110 @m7fr 105m66m 9m34m 59m
1? 1t0 16 Tfi
177o ?m18m ?fr
1 450 2m290 49
9?n
14m
11m
1m
2m
45&
690t 170
135
2ffi
3s0
17 8ru
5 950
4ffi
?40
20 24 51
10 1? 17
10 't3 17
14?1A
?8 32 41
10 14 18
25 30 s7
8lb45
2127jr"
14 17 23
13 17 20
E?73
117527
17?530
679
3.8
3.1
4.3
6.1
3.7
3.1
5.7
4.7
6.?
9.3
?.2 ?.7
1.7 ?.2
2.6 3.3
5.8 5.2
?.1 2.7
1.9 2.4
3.1 4.2
3.1 3.5
3.6 4.6
5.6 6.9
3.5 4.1
2.8 3.4
5.5 8.0
4.2 5.3
?.8 3.4
4.9
4.2
8.9
7.1
4.?
51m 138m 67ffi a 3225 5.23.92.9
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Sqrrce : Fetroteu Ecssrist 1S1, Septenber
TTIES 5
I{ORLD ESTIiTATED OIL PRODUCTION
IhoJsrd tqr€s
TRADE AND PAY!{ENTS (US I mitLions)
Africa
Nilpria
Libya
ALgeria
G&on
Ingota/CSirda
Trnisia
Cmrqrr
cffp
Zaire
Ivory Coast
GhaE
t{arocco
Jar.-Jue
1980
JuLy-Dec.
1S0
Jar.-Jue
1981
? E35
45 $t5
26 994m3&
2 77a
1 350
15n
5?2.
1m
a
19 411
3734?w
14m
1269
501
50
6
a
1?338,7
48 915
rc 530
24ffi
4 tA5
41 m
35 EZ5
am
41m
35m2m2m
18m
5m
1fr
50
20
115 565
Exports fob
Inports fob
BALANCE :
4e3.? 1512.0 | 584.21 SOs.rlrOSr.c
3Ee.e I:lo.r I ssq.s I ttg.z I sst-s
103.3 l-28.3 I ZS.S I AS.SI'.tt,t,.t,
Source : ABECOR, Country report, Aprit 1980, distributed by
-13.51 +32.61 +15.6
Source : I.!i.F- Internat i ona I FinanciaI Statistics
Exports I I 11?'tZ 1 309 I 1 815Importslll6?9 55E I 555
r 1980 : Est i srate
Source : ABE€OR, Country report, Sept. 1981, distributed by
NIGERIA*t
E xport s
Import s
27 000
18 000
*i 198p : Estinate - 1981 : Forecast
Source : I8lQ, Oct. 1981
- ffi
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1976
751 1 260
1 300
694
606
2 487
6qe
1 798
20 000
22
9 000 -2 000
Note : IncIudes private nonguaranteed debt.
a. Compound annual rate of change
Source : }'lortd DeveLopment Report, 19EI
TABLE 6
TABLE 7
OPEC ancl OECO aiOtSZ4-1980
(Net dsuJBem€nts as a percenege d GNPI
TABLE 8
LOI{E I - COFINANCEMENTS
48 Projects
3600 m'ittions ECU or /.800 nril'tions US 6
Medium amount 75 M ECU or 100 M US 6
Benefiting states 2? ZCommunity 36 7.EDF 16.3
EIB ?.5
Member states 17.4
Arabian funds 16 Y'
BrRD 1? il
0ther money lenders 14 Z
Countrv qroup
Bi I Lions of
current dot Iars
1970 1980
Bi Ltions of
1978 dol.Iars
1970 1980
Percentage
reaL grorth,
1 970-Eoa
0 i L importers
Low- i ncome
Mi dd Ie- i ncome
48.0 301.3
14 .5 48.0
33.5 ?53.3
102.6 250.9
31.0 40.0
71.6 210.9
9.4
?.6
11 .4
- 71 - PE 80.462lfin.
nor." Io*o
ANNEX
OIL TACILITY
l{exico and Venezueta signed an agreement in August 1980 (CONVEN0
DE SAN JOSE, Costa Rica) under rhich itexico and Venezueta undertake to try
to meet 5t 7 ol the oit import requirements of the foLtowing countries :
Barbados, Costa Rica, Domenica, Et Sal.vador, Guatema[a, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama.
This tist appties to the time of the signature.. BeLize and Haiti may have
since joined.
Operation of the facitity
70 I of the invoice is paid under normal commercial conditions.
The remaining 30 t can be paid over 5 years at a 4 Z rate of interest. The
tatter can be reduced to 2 1 over a 20 year period if the amount being finan-
ced is used to devetop cnergy infrastrucutre projects rithin the countries
such as a refinery of ports to facilitate the del,ivery of oil..
'Mexico and Venezueta both make E0r000 barrets per day avaitab[e
under this programme.
Facitity for Financing 0i[, Fertitizer and Asphatt Purchases by CARICOltl States
from Trinidad and Tobago
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has been operating an aid
mechanism s'ince 1978 to assist members of the Caribbean Cornmunity rhich are
experiencing ssvers economic probtems. Hoyever, the project oriented nature
of this mechanisn has undergone substantial change in Light of the intensif-
ication of such difficutties in the wake of a neu round of price increasesfor petroteum prodtcts in 1979, and noy takes the forar of a facil'ity.
The faci[ity has been structured to privide for the financing of
incrementat costs of petroteum products, fertitizers, and asphal.t to el.igibteparticipants, uhere. these products are suppl.ied from Trinidad and Tobago.
The fscitity came into effect on January 1, 1980. Horever, since
the renered acceteration in the price of crude oiL and its products statedin earty 1979, the alrket prices at January 9, 1979 are used as the base prices
aga'inst uhich to catculate incrementat costs.
Th: tife of the facitity yitL be determined by subseguent eventsin the petroteun market, but an initiat [ife span of three years has been set
with a committmcnt to review experience and the outtook at the end of thatperiod before deciding thether or not to continue the facitity. The totat
size of the facil.ity yitl. not exceed I 500 mitlion over the three year period.
El.igibte countries fatt into one of tuo categories : ll,ore Developed
Countries (Barbadosr Jaoaica, and Guyana) and the Less Devetoped Countries(Eastern Caribbean Coomon llarket). Terms of the toans are as foltoys : Haturity
of 15 years. inctuding 3 years grace at an interest rate of 3 I lor llDCs and
2 il foc LD[s, with interest capitatized during the grace period.
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